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CASENOTES
Rights Without A Remedy — Illegal Aliens Under The National Labor Relations Act:
Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Company v. NLRB' — Section 2(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act2 (NLRA or Act) defines who shall he an "employee" for the purposes
of the Act. Courts have traditionally given broad latitude to the National Labor Relations
Board's (NLRB or Board) interpretation of this section. An employer who discharges
an employee under the Act because of that employee's exercise of his or her NLRA
rights commits an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 3
This prohibition extends to surreptitious efforts by employers to rid themselves of
employees who exercise their NLRA rights by making it appear that the employees quit.
This situation is termed a constructive discharge. 4 Section 10 of the Act grants the NLRB
the power to prevent anyone from engaging in unfair labor practices, 5 and the Board
may under section 10(c) take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the
Act in redressing unfair labor practices.6 Courts have permitted the Board wide discre-
tion in fashioning remedies, deferring to the Board's expertise in labor relations, as long
as the remedial order effectuates the Act's policies and is not punitive. In Sure-Tan, Inc.
104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984).
2 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). The statutory text of § 2(3) reads:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this Act explicitly states otherwise, and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in con-
nection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer
subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other
person who is not an employer as herein defined.
5 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1982). The text of § 8(a)(1) and (3) reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; ... (3) by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....
The text of § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), reads, in relevant part: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
A constructive discharge is where the employer, motivated by anti-union animus, creates
"intolerable" conditions so that the employee is forced to quit. Such quits are seen as constructive
discharges and as such the employer violates § 8(a)(1) and (3). Seel'. KHREL, LABOR Law § 12.05111[a]
(1982).
5 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
6 Section 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982), reads, in relevant part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and
Cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including rein-
statement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
Act ...
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and Surak Leather Co. v. NLRB' the United States Supreme Court addressed the issues
of whether illegal aliens" can be employees within the meaning of the NLRA, whether
certain illegal aliens had been constructively discharged, and whether the remedies
fashioned by the Board and the court of appeals were appropriate.
The petitioners in Sure- Tan were small leather processing firms, deemed a single
integrated employer," located in Chicago, Illinois.'" In July, 1976, a union' (Union)
began to organize the employees, 12
 most of whom were illegal aliens.'" The Union was
elected on December 10, 1976.' 4
 The petitioners filed objections'" to the election on the
104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984).
This casenote uses the term "illegal alien employees" rather than "undocumented aliens" or
"undocumented workers" so as to better convey their situation in our society. The illegal immigration
status of an alien is defined by the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), § 275, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325 (1982). The pertinent statutory text reads:
Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as designated
by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration offi-
cers, or (3) obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading repre-
sentation or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall, for the first commission
of any such offenses, be guilty of a misdemeanor ... and for a subsequent commission
of any such offenses shall be guilty of a felony.
• 104 S. Ct. at 2804. The two firms — Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Co. — were finuid by
the Board to constitute a single employer within the meaning of the Act. Sure-Tan Surak Leather
Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 138, 139 (1977), enf'd, 583 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1978). The Board based this
holding on its finding that the two businesses were affiliated, with common officers, ownerships,
directors, and operators, and with a common labor policy. Id.
0 104 S. Ct. at 2806.
" The union was the Chicago Leather Workers Union, Local 431, Amalgamated Mealcutters
and Butcher Workmen of North America. Id.
' 2 1d. The employer coercively interrogated, threatened, and cajoled the employees in an
attempt to defeat the organizing campaign. Id.
"Id. These employees were Mexican nationals present in the United States without visas or
immigration papers authorizing them to work. See supra note 8.
" 104 S. Ct. at 2806.
15 Id. A union (or employees) may file an election petition with the Regional Office of the
NLRB. 29 C.F.R. § 101,18(a) (1984). To invoke the Board's election machinery the union must also
submit proof that at least thirty -
 percent of the employees have designated the union as their
representative. This showing of interest is usually demonstrated by signed authorization cards. Id.
§ 101.17. A field examiner from the Regional Office will then investigate the petition to determine
whether the Board has jurisdiction, whether there are reasonable questions of the bargaining unit
configuration, whether the election would effectuate the purpose of the Act, and whether there is
sufficient probability that the employees have selected the union as their representative. Id.
§ 101.18(a). If there are questions raised concerning representation which are not informally
adjusted, notice is given of a formal, nonadversarial hearing before the regional director. Id.
§ 101.20(a), (c). The regional director then issues a decision either directing an election or dismissing
the case. Id. During the election the employer may challenge ballots individually on the basis of
voter eligibility, id. § 101.19(a)(4), (b), and may also file objections to the election results generally
within five days of the election tally. Id. The regional director then conducts an investigation. Id. if
the parties have not previously agreed to be bound by the regional director's determinations, id.
§ 101,19(a), the parties may file exceptions to the regional director's report within ten days with
the Board. Id. § 101.19(b). If the parties have agreed to follow the informal decision of the regional
director, the regional director may dismiss the objections and certify the union, or order a new
election. Id. § 101.19(a)(4). Section 10(f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982), provides that a
party may have judicial review if "aggrieved by a final order," but any Board decision at this point
is not judicially reviewable, since decisions in representation proceedings are not "final orders."
American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 411 (1940). To secure judicial review of its
objections the employer must commit an unfair labor practice. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
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grounds, inter alio, that six of the seven eligible voters were illegal aliens. 16 The Regional
Director found that the employees were entitled to the protection of the NLRA despite
their illegal alien status, 0 and consequently certified the Union on January 17, 1977. 18
Petitioners received notice of this decision on January 19, 1977.' 9
On the next day, January 20, 1977, petitioners' president sent the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) a letter giving the names of five employees, claiming they
were Mexican nationals, and asking the INS to check their status as soon as possible.29
On February 18, 1977 INS agents inspected petitioners' premises, and found that the
five employees were living and working illegally in the United States. 21 The INS agents
arrested the five employees and removed them. 22 Later that day these five were placed
on a bus, at their own expense, bound ultimately for Mexico. 22
An administrative law judge (ALA) heard the unfair labor practice complaints issued
by the NLRB Regional Director against Sure-Tan. 24 The AUJ concluded that the illegal
aliens were employees within the meaning of the Act, and that the employer had
constructively discharged them in violation of the Act. 25 The ALJ reasoned that the
aliens' removal to Mexico made them unavailable for reinstatement or backpay. 2° The
ALJ recommended, however, that the Board issue a reinstatement order allowing the
illegal alien employees six months to return to the United States, 27 and suggested a four
month minimum backpay award. 28 The Board adopted the ALJ's decision 29 except for
LAW 43 (West 1976). If the union files a complaint, and the Board finds a violation, the employer
may then go to court to have the Board's order set aside on the grounds of error in the represen-
tation proceeding. Id.
16 104 S. Ct. at 2806.
17 NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1978).
Id. The Board denied Sure-Tan's request for a review of the ruling. Id. Sure-Tan refused to
bargain collectively. Id. The Union filed a charge on March 1, 1977, and the Board's General
Counsel issued a complaint. Id. A refusal to bargain collectively with a certified union is an unfair
labor practice, in violation of section 8(a)( I) and (5) of the Act. The text of section 8(a) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1082), reads in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7; ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees The Board granted summary judgment on August 4, 1977, ordering Sure-Tan to
bargain with the Union and to post appropriate notices. 583 F.2d at 357.
ID Sore-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2806.
.2u Id.
21. Id.
22 Id.
23 NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2c1 592, 599 (7th Cir. 1982). Each employee executed an INS
Form 1-274, acknowledging his illegal status and accepting the INS's gram of voluntary departure
as a substitute for deportation. Id. To be eligible for voluntary departure the alien must pay for his
or her own departure and establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that he or she is,
and has been, a person of' good moral character for the last five years. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982).
The gram of voluntary departure avoids the stigma of deportation, allows the alien to choose his
or her destination, and makes future legal reentry into the United States considerably easier than
if he or she were deported. See Jain v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 612 F.2d 683, 686
n.1 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980).
24 104 S. Ct. at 2807. See Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1978).
25 104 S. Ct. at 2807.
26 Id.
27 Id .
"
25 Id.
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the remedies portion, ordering instead the conventional remedy of reinstatement with
backpay, and leaving questions of unavailability to compliance proceedings."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's
ruling, except as to remedies." The court modified the order to condition reinstatement
on the discharged aliens' legal presence in the country and to expand the reinstatement
period to four years." As to backpay, the court required that backpay be tolled for
periods when the discharged employees were not legally in the country, but also ordered
a six month minimum backpay award."
The United States Supreme Court in Sure -Tan, Inc. and Sara* Leather Co. v. NLRB 34
held that illegal alien workers are employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the
NLRA," and that section 8(a)(3) of the Act applies to unfair labor practices committed
against such illegal aliens." The Court stated that when an employer reports the presence
of an illegal alien employee to the INS in retaliation for the employee's protected union
activity, and the employer's report then results in the illegal alien's exit from the country,
there is a discriminatory constructive discharge in violation of section 8(a)(3). 37 While
acknowledging that the Board is empowered by section 10(c) of the Act to take affirmative
remedial action for section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practices," the Court took care to mark
the boundaries of the Board's remedial power. According to the Court, the Board, not
the courts of appeals, should fashion remedial measures, 39 and those measures must
comport with federal immigration law.30 Specifically, the Court ruled that a reinstatement
order must be conditioned on legal presence in the United States." In addition, the
Court held that the Board cannot order a conjectural minimum backpay award. Ac-
cording to the Court, a backpay order must be based on concrete evidence and be
sufficiently tailored to the specific unfair labor practice it is intended to redress.4 2 Finally,
the Court ruled that backpay must be tolled during the aliens' illegal presence in the
United States."
The Sure - Tan decision will have a significant impact on the rights of the 3.5 to 5
million illegal aliens in the United States." By holding that illegal aliens are employees
under the Act, the Court recognizes that this group must be taken into account in
36 Id.
3, Id. at 2808. See NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1982).
32
 104 S. Ct. at 2808.
s3
34 Id. at 2803.
35 Id. at 2808, 2809. 29 U.S.C. g 152(3) (1982).
36
 104 S. Ct. at `2811.29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1982).
" 104 S. Ct. at 2810-12.
36 Id. at 2812.
" Id. at 2812-13. The majority held that the court of appeals had erred in modifying the
Board's order by expanding the reinstatement period to four years. Id. at 2816. The majority
similarly reversed the court of appeals for exceeding its reviewing authority on drafting and
verification. Id.
4° Id. at 2815.
4, Id.
42 Id. at 2814.
" Id. at 2815.
44
 See Kutchins & Tweedy, No Two Ways About It: Employer Sanctions Versus Labor Law Protections
For Undocumented Workers, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 339, 343 (1983) (citing CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, SELECTED READINGS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW 6 (1980)).
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national labor policy. The Court's holding that the employer's notification of the em-
ployees' illegal alien status to the INS constituted a constructive discharge could have
provided greater protection of NLRA rights to illegal'aliens. The Court's establishment
of a stricter standard of judicial review of the Board's decision, however, narrows the
scope of the Board's remedial powers and results in illegal aliens having NLRA rights,
but no remedy. Thus, the Sure- Tan decision undercuts the strength of unions attempting
to organize illegal alien employees and provide them with protection. Mor .eover, the
Sure-Tan decision undercuts the ability of American workers to organize and elect a
union to represent them. An employer can now hire illegal aliens — who will avoid
unionization for fear of provoking their employer into notifying the INS of their pres-
ence — in order to dilute the strength of unionization sentiment among its legally present
employees.
Part I of this casenote presents the background on the significant aspects of the
Sure -Tan decision. This section focuses on the status of illegal aliens under the NLRA
by examining the legislative history of the Act as well as relevant Board and court
decisions. Part I concludes with a discussion of the background of the constructive
discharge doctrine and the scope of the Board's remedial power. Part II examines the
procedural history of Sure- Tan and the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Part III critiques
the Supreme Court decision. This section maintains that the Court's holding that illegal
aliens are employees under the NLRA is consistent with previous interpretations of the
Act. Part III also argues that the Court's finding of constructive discharge, though
proper, was not necessary under the previous contours of the constructive discharge
doctrine. Finally, Part III asserts that the Court in Sure-Tan announced a new, more
intrusive standard of review and stated a narrower scope of the Board's remedial au-
thority without sufficient justification. By reaching this decision the Court mocks its own
holding that the court of appeals had overstepped its bounds in modifying the Board's
order, as well as its own holding that illegal aliens are employees under the Act. Thus,
this casenote concludes that the Sure -Tan decision endows illegal aliens rights without a
remedy.
I. HISTORY OF THE STATUS OF ILLEGAL ALIENS UNDER THE NLRA, THE DOCTRINE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE, AND Tim SCOPE OF THE NLRB's REMEDIAL AUTHORITY
The Background section examines the three large topics that the Sure-Tan decision
covers. Section A examines the Board's and courts' decisions concerning whether illegal
aliens are employees under the NLRA, Section B then presents the background of the
doctrine of constructive discharge, that is, when the employer will be deemed to have
discharged an employee in violation of the NLRA without having formally fired the
employee. Finally, section C examines the nature and scope of the NLRA's grant of
remedial power, thereby providing a context for analyzing the remedial orders in Sure-
Tan.
A. Illegal Miens as Employees Under the NLRA
In determining whether illegal aliens are "employees" within the meaning of the
Act, subsection 1 will examine the legislative history of the NLRA. Because this legislative
history is inconclusive, subsection 2 looks to past Board decisions for further authority
on the status of illegal aliens under the Act. After subsection 3 presents the standard of
judicial review of the Board's construction of the NRLA in general and the definition
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of "employee" in particular, subsection 4 examines courts of appeals' reviews of NLRB
rulings regarding whether illegal aliens are employees within the meaning of section
2(3) of the NLRA.
1.. Legislative History
The legislative history of the NLRA indicates that Congress never specifically con-
sidered whether an illegal alien worker could be included in the term "employee." The
Senate and House reports referred to the definition of employee in section 2(3) of the
Act as "self-explanatory."" The legislators intended the meaning to be broad and ac-
cordingly a common-sense definition, being understood on the House floor during
debates as including "every individual on th[e] pay roll."sc When Congress amended
section 2(3) of the NLRA through the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the
House report reiterated this understanding. 47 The 1947 amendments specifically exclude
from the definition of "employee" any individual employed as a supervisor and any
individual having the status of an independent contractor." These distinctions further
indicate that Congress intended "employee" be given a broad, common-sense definition
based upon the workplace function of the laborer, and the economic relationship between
the laborer and employer, rather than upon legal classifications.
While legislative history must be referred to as an initial source when interpreting
a statute, in this case Congress did not specifically consider the status of illegal aliens
under the Act, although Congress did intend the definition of "employee" to be applied
broadly and functionally. Because the legislative history of the NLRA is inconclusive on
this issue, further assistance in interpreting the meaning of employee under the Act can
be found by examining NLRB practice.
as See Note, Illegal Aliens- as "Employees" Under the National Labor Relations Act: NLRB v. Apollo
Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979), 68 GE°. L. J. 851, 856 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Illegal Aliens as Employees] (citing S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1935) (definition of
"employee" called self-explanatory); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9—It) (1935) (defi-
nition of "employee" called self-explanatory)). Set! also Note, Retaliatory Reporting of Illegal Alien
Employees: Remedying the Labor-Immigration Conflict, 80 Comm. L. REV. 1296, 1297-98 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Retaliatory Reporting].
' 6
 79 Conti. Rm. 9686 (1935) reports the following exchange between Rep. Taylor and Rep.
Connery, chairman of the Committee on Labor:
Mr. Taylor: Does that mean that every 1112111 on the payroll has it within his own right
or privilege to join whatever labor union he wants at that plant? Mr. Connery: Yes
.... Mr. Taylor: Beginning al the top of the scale of the payroll, at what point would
you segregate them and say to one that he belongs to the employer class and m another
that he belongs to the employee class? Mr. Connery: They have not had any difficulty
about that in any of the boards. The Federal Trade Commission or any other Federal
board never had any trouble finding out who was an employer or employee.
4 See Note, Retaliatory Reporting, supra note 45, at 1298 n.9 (1980), which quotes H.R. REP. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947) as follows:
"An 'employee,' according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as the
courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone ...
means someone who works for another for hire .... Congress intended then [in 1935,
when it passed the NLRA], and it intends now, that the Board give to words not far-
fetched meanings but ordinary meanings."
"See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982), as amended by 61 Stat. 137 (1947).
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2. NLRB Decisions
The Board has consistently held that illegal aliens are employees within section 2(3)
of the Act, 49 but this practice has not had a long history, dating back only to 1973. 5°
Despite these several years of consistently ruling that illegal aliens are employees within
section 2(3), and thus entitled to protections of the Act, the Board has not provided a
sound rationale for reaching this result. 51 In finding that illegal aliens are employees
under the Act, the Board has merely cited to previous Board decisions which stood
either for the same proposition, 52 or for the rule that noncitizenship is'not a basis for
exclusion from a bargaining unit or disqualification from voting in elections conducted
by the Board." The Board, therefore, has held that the NLRA accorded protection to
illegal aliens' exercise of section 7 rights without clearly articulating the reasons for
extending such protection from noncitizens to illegal aliens. 54 There has been a similar
49 See infra notes 53-54 for cases holding that illegal aliens are employees within the meaning
of the NLRA.
See Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1973).
51 See Casenote, Labor Law — Illegal Aliens Are Employees Under 29 U.S.G. § 152(3) (1976) And
May Vole in Union Certification Elections: NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978), 10
Ru-r.-CAM. 747, 751 n.34 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Casenote, Illegal Aliens in Certification Elections];
Note, Illegal Aliens as Employees, supra note 45, at 856-57. In NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355
(7th Cir. 1978), Judge Wood stated: "I am not persuaded in this instance by the argument that
since the Board's interpretation is one of long standing it is therefore entitled to great weight. I
view it as only a case of the Board having been wrong for a long time." Id. at 361-62 (Wood, J.,
dissenting).
w See infra. note 54 for cases supporting this proposition.
" See, e.g., Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L,R,B, 1094, 1095 (1973) (eligibility of aliens to vote
in Board elections "well established"); Seidmon, Seidmon, Herikin & Seidmon, 102 N.L.R.B. 1492,
1493 (1953) (eligibility of aliens to vote in Board elections well established"); Cities Service Oil Co.
of Pennsylvania, 87 N.L.R.B, 324, 331 (1949) (Board rejected employer's objections to election,
responding, "[t]he eligibility of aliens to cast ballots in Board elections is too well established to
warrant justification anew here"); Azusa Citrus Assoc., 65 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1138 (1946) (Board
rejected petition to exclude Mexican Nationals from bargaining unit, stating, "kin accordance with
our prior determination we shall permit Mexican Nationals to participate in the election hereinafter
directed if they are otherwise eligible"); Allen & Sandilands Packing Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 724, 730
(1944) (Board rejected petition to exclude Mexican Nationals from bargaining units, stating, "non-
citizenship is neither a ground for exclusion from a bargaining unit nor a disqualification for
participating in elections conducted by the Board"); In re Dan Logan & J.R. Paxton, 55 N.L.R.B.
310, 315 n.12 (1944) (Board held that noncitizenship does not disqualify employees from voting in
elections because the Act does not differentiate citizens from noncitizens, and not making such a
distinction effectuates the purposes of the Act).
" See, e.g„ Sun Country Citrus, 268 N.L.R.B. 700 (1984) (illegal aliens possess § 7 rights and
may not be discriminatorily' treated for their exercise, in violation of § 8(a)(1)); La Mousse, Inc.,
259 N.L.R.B. 37 (1981) (employee's illegal alien status is irrelevant in a discriminatory discharge
case); Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1978) (employee's illegal alien status is irrelevant in a
discriminatory discharge case); Hasa Chem., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 903 (1978) (NLRA extends protec-
tions to illegal alien employees who are interrogated and coerced by their employer in violation of
§ 8(a)(1)): Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1978) (employee's illegal alien status is irrelevant in
a discriminatory discharge case); John Dory Boat Works, 229 N.L.R.B. 844 (1977) (NLRA extends
protections to illegal alien employees who are interrogated and coerced by their employer in
violation of § 8(a)(I)); Sure-Tan, Inc.. 231 N.L.R.B. 138 (1977) (immigration status of employees
in bargaining unit is no bar to Board certification of union); Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227
N.L. R. B. 214 (1976) (NLRA protects illegal alien employees from discriminatory discharges violative
of § 8(a)(3)); Handling Equipment Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 64 (1974) (aliens "lacking working papers"
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lack of analysis in representation cases." Thus the Board's consistent rulings merely
amounted to reiteration rather than analysis."
The Board filially recognized in the 1980 case of Duke City Lumber, Inc. v. NLRB"
that its previous decisions had only analyzed the Act's coverage in terms of alienage per
se, rather than on the basis of the legal or illegal status of such aliens in determining
exclusions from bargaining units. In Duke City Lumber an employer owned two sawmills
in Texas and employed 185 employees.58 A labor organization at the sawmills sought to
represent a unit formed by all employees except illegal aliens." The labor organization
contended that the illegal aliens had an insufficient community of interests with the
other employees. 60
 The Board held that under the NLRA no distinctions can be made
between citizens and noncitizens." Thus there was no reason, the Board stated, to
exclude employees from a bargaining unit on the basis of their illegal immigration
status. 62
In explaining its decision not to distinguish illegal alien employees from other
employees, the Board noted that the evidence failed to show that the employees — illegal
aliens and other workers — did not have a community of interest with regard to wages,
hours, benefits, job duties, or terms and conditions of employment. 63
 The fact that the
aliens were illegally present in the United States was irrelevant, the Board further stated,
because no Federal legislation prohibited the hiring of illegal aliens," and it was not
within the Board's authority to alter the obligations imposed by the NLRA in order to
pursue immigration policies- 65
This review of NLRB practice shows that the Board has consistently deemed illegal
aliens to be covered by the Act without giving any justification. Only recently in Duke
City Lumber has the Board explained its rationale, and there the rationale was that no
exclusion of illegal aliens appeared within the four corners of the Act. As a final aid to
interpreting the definition of "employee" in the NLRA, this casenote turns, after briefly
setting out the standard of judicial review of the status of illegal aliens under the Act,
to decisions of courts of appeals.
are employees under the Act); Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1973) (an alien em-
ployee, legally in the country on a student visa, but without a green card, held to be eligible to vote
as an "employee" in a Board election).
55
 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
56 Note, Illegal Aliens as Employees, supra note 45, at 851 n.3; Casenote, Illegal Aliens in Certification
Elections, supra note 51, at 751 n,34, The rule that the Board will not distinguish between citizens
and noncitizens is itself without a firm analytic foundation. The NLRB formulated the rule in dicta
in In re Dan Logan & J.R. Paxton, 55 N.L.R.B. 310, 315 n.12 (1944), a representation case. The In
re Dan Logan Board supported its rule by a 'cf." cite to In re United States Bedding, 52 N.L.R.B.
382, 388 (1944), a case which held that race is an impermissible criterion in the determination of
the appropriate bargaining unit, because of the national policy of nondiscrimination on the basis
of race, creed, color, or national origin.
57 251 N.L.R.B. 53, 53 (1980).
58 Id.
59 Id.
55 Id,
6 ' Id.
62 Id.
55 Id.
" Id. at 53-54.
65 Id. at 54.
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3. The Standard of Judicial Review of the NLRB's Construction of the NLRA
In Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB 66 the Court stated that the Board's construction of the
Act should be upheld if it is "reasonably defensible" and should not be rejected merely
because the reviewing court might prefer another view of the statute. 67 In the 1978 case
of NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers68 the Court stated that although the reviewing court might prefer a different
application of the NLRA, Congress committed primarily to the Board the responsibility
of interpreting the NLRA to effectuate national labor policy. 69 Moreover, in the 1944
case of NLRB v. Hearst Publications 70 the Court explained that the expertise of the Board
will frequently bear on the question of who is an employee under the Act. 7 ' Courts
should give considerable deference to the Board's decisions in this area, the Court further
reasoned, because Congress assigned the task of defining who is an employee under the
Act primarily to the Board, and because the Board, through its everyday experience in
the administration of the Act, is more familiar with the circumstances and backgrounds
of employment relationships in various industries." The "reasonably defensible" stan-
dard of review, therefore, entails a significant degree of deference to the Board's deter-
mination of who constitutes an employee under the Act.
4. Circuit Courts of Appeals' Decisions
Prior to the Sure -Tan case only two circuit courts of appeals had faced the question
of whether illegal alien employees are "employees" within the meaning of the NLRA.
The first was the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. ,
Sure -Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Co. (Surak Leather)," and the second was the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., Inc. 74
Surak Leather involved a challenge to a union authorization campaign" preceeding
the events leading to Sure -Tan, although the cases are unrelated procedurally." In Surak
Leather the controversy arose when, after the Union won the ballots of six out of the
seven employees eligible to vote," the employer refused to bargain collectively with the
union." The Board held that illegal aliens are employees under the NLRA, and therefore
can vote in a Board election."
66 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
67 Id. at 497.
" 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
66 Id. at '350.
7° 322 U.S. 1 1 l (1944).
7 ' Id. at 130-31.
" Id. at 130.
" 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978). For the sake of clarity, this case will be referred to as Surak
Leather, but courts and commentators refer to it as Sure-Tan or Sure -Tan 1. As stated previously,
supra note 9, this case is factually connected but procedurally unrelated to the Sure -Tan case that is
the subject of this casenote.
74 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979).
75 Sarah Leather, 583 F.2d A 356.
" 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd in part and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984).
77 583 F.2d at 357.
" Id.
79 Id.
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In the Sarah Leather enforcement proceedings" the employer argued that the cer-
tification of the Union was improper because a majority of the employees who voted
were illegal aliens." The Seventh Circuit held that illegal aliens were employees under
the Act and thus were eligible to vote in a certification election. 82 In explaining its
decision, the court first noted the longstanding and consistent interpretation by the
Boaid that aliens are employees under the Act.83 Second, the court determined that the
language of the Act does not specifically exclude aliens, but instead is written broadly."
Third, the court stated that the Board's interpretation is entitled to great deference and
will be upheld unless there are "compelling indications that it is wrong." 85 The court
then determined that holding illegal aliens to be covered by the Act was consistent with
federal immigration policy, because no immigration statute prohibits illegal aliens from
employment nor from voting in a Board election. 88 Declining to certify the Union on
the grounds that it is composed of illegal aliens, the court concluded, would actually
encourage illegal immigration, because employers would have an extra incentive to hire
illegal aliens and thus decrease the likelihood of unionization."
The Ninth Circuit addressed the same question of the status of illegal aliens under
the NLRA in NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co. 88 In this case, several alien employees were dis-
charged by their employer in retaliation for the employees' filing of a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor charging that the employer had failed to pay its employees
overtime wages." The court affirmed the Board's finding of unfair labor practices and
its issuance of cease and desist and reinstatement orders." At issue before the court of
appeals in Apollo Tire was whether the Board's exclusion of evidence of the employees'
undocumented immigration status was improper." The court enforced the Board's
order,92 holding that the Board had not erred in excluding evidence that the employees
were illegal aliens. 93 The Apollo Tire court followed the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit
in Surak Leather and held that illegal aliens were employees within the meaning of the
Act..94 The court agreed with the Surak Leather decision that deference to the Board's
consistent interpretation of the Act as including aliens is appropriate and that giving
illegal aliens the protection of the NLRA would best further the policies underlying the
immigration laws."
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sure-Tan, the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits — the only circuits to address the issue — held that illegal alien workers were
8° Id.
81 /d. at 358.
82 Id. at 359.
83 Id.
84 Id.
88 Id.
86 Id.
82 Id. at 360.
90 604 F.2.(1 1180 (9th Cif. 1979).
"Id. at 1181-82.
9" Id. at 1182, 1184. The unfair labor practices were held to be violations of section 8(a)(1) and
(4) of the Act.
9 ' 604 1,-.2ci at 1181.
99 Id, at 1184.
95 Id.
9, Id.
95 Id.
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"employees" within the meaning of the NLRA. Both circuits based their decisions on
judicial deference to the Board's past practice, and the absence of any explicit exclusion
of illegal aliens within the language of the NLRA itself, or any explicit conflict with
immigration legislation. Finally, both courts considered their holding to be consistent
with the immigration laws' policy of curtailing illegal immigration. Even though the Surak
Leather and Apollo Tire courts relied heavily on the doctrine of judicial deference to the
NLRB, these courts of appeals looked beyond the inconclusive legislative history of the
Act and the four corners of the Act itself in concluding that illegal aliens are employees
under the Act.
If illegal alien employees are considered to be "employees" within the meaning of
the NLRA, as they were in past NLRB decisions and in the courts of appeals' decisions
in Surak Leather and Apollo Tire, then the illegal alien employees will receive the rights
and protections of the NLRA. One of the most important rights given to employees
under this national labor legislation is protection against discharges — including con-
structive discharges — which are motivated by the employees' exercise of their NLRA
rights.
B. The Doctrine of Constructive Discharge
Section 8(a)( I) and (3)" of the NLRA prohibits an employer from discharging an
employee for that employee's membership in or support of a union. 97 An employer may
try to effectively fire a worker because of that worker's union activity by arranging
working conditions in such a way that the worker appears to quit voluntarily rather than
remain under the terms and conditions of employment established by the employer."
If the NLRB finds that the employer's conduct was motivated by an employee's exercise
of rights guaranteed by the NLRA, the Board will find the apparent "quit" to have been
in fact a "constructive discharg-e,"99 and thus rule that the employer violated section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.“)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the 1981 case of NLRB
v. Haberman Construction Co. 101 articulated a two-prong test for finding a constructive
discharge.'" The first prong of the test is that the employer must have created working
conditions so intolerable that an employee is forced to quit.'° 3 The Board and courts
have defined broadly the element of intolerable working conditions, finding that such
working conditions may be characterized by harassment and humiliation,Im and material
96 See supra note 3 fir the pertinent statutory text of section 8(a)(1) and (3).
97 R. GORMAN, supra note 15, at 137.
98 Id.
99 Id.
'"° T. Kninn., supra note 4, § 12.05[1114
'°' 641 F.2d '351 (5th Cir. 1981) (rehearing en bane).
'"2 Id. at 358.
Id. See, e.g., In re Texas Textile Mills, 58 N.L.R.B. 352,353-54 (1944), where the employer,
contrary to its usual practice, replaced an employee in the work he ordinarily performed and
required him to perform duties winch, as the employer knew, were injurious to the employee's
hands and caused intolerable physical pain.
'" 4 See, e.g., NLRB v. Holly Bra of California, Inc., 405 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1969). In Holly Bra
the court affirmed the Board's finding that an employee had been constructively discharged by her
employer. Id. at 871-72. The employee was active in organizing for a union. Id. at 871. After the
election, the employer harrassed the employee on the job, claiming her work was intentionally done
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changes in job assignment and conditions.'°5
 Moreover, the Board has in one case held
that it is unnecessary that an employer's use of harassment and humiliation occur at the
work site or be closely connected with working conditions for the intolerable working
conditions prong of the constructive discharge test to be satisfied.'"
The second prong of the constructive discharge test is that the employer must have
acted with anti-union animus, that is, with specific intent "to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization" within the meaning of section 8(a)(3) of the
Act. 1 °7
 Where anti-union animus is specifically shown, the employer may still raise the
defense that it also acted for nondiscriminatory reasons. Accordingly, the Board and
courts must determine if the purportedly legitimate reasons are actually pretext, in
carelessly and poorly. Id. The administrative law judge had concluded that the employer's treatment
of the employee was a management scheme to humiliate and harass her, so as to force her into
quitting her job. Id. at 872. In Perko's, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 884 (1978), the Board also held that an
employee who quit had been constructively discharged. The Board found that the employer
subjected the employee to petty verbal harassment; threatened to eliminate her hours of work;
reduced her hours of work; scheduled her for Sunday work knowing it was especially onerous due
to her family responsibilities; and was motivated by anti-union animus, with intent to discourage
the employee's engaging in protected union activity. Id. at 901. But see P.E. Van Pelt, 238 N.L.R.B.
794 (1978), where the Board found anti-union animus by an employer, but held that an employee
who quit was not working under sufficiently adverse conditions to find that he had been construc-
tively discharged. Id. at 802. The employer in that case had issued written warnings to employees
because of their union activities. Id. Although this conduct by the employer in and of itself violated
the Act, the improper warnings and harassment directed toward the employees did not make the
working conditions "physically or emotionally impossible." Id. Similarly, in Keller Mfg. Co., 237
N.L.R.B. 712 (1978), the Board held that an employee who quit due to stressful working conditions
had not been constructively discharged. Id. at 723. The Board found that the evidence failed to
establish that such intolerable conditions were imposed such that employer reasonably should have
expected employee to quit. Id. at 724. Alternatively, according to the Board, the stressful conditions
— derogatory remarks by another employee — were not attributable to the employer. Id. at 723.
'" See, e.g., Transportation Management Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 760 (1981), where the Board
found that employees had been constructively discharged where the employer wok away the
employees' delivery trucks, making it impossible for them to do their jobs. Id. at 760. Return of the
trucks was conditioned on the employees' waiving their right to strike. Id. See also J.P. Stevens &
Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972), where the court, affirming the Board, held that a
female employee who quit had been constructively discharged. Id. at 491. The employee had
supported unionizing at a nonunion plant. Id. at 494. The employer changed her pay from hourly
wage to piecemeal rate. Id. At the new rate she was unable to make even federal minimum wage.
Id. at 494 n.2. The employer's anti-union animus was clear. Id. at 495. c f. Thurston Motor Lines,
237 N.L.R.B. 498 (1978), where the Board held that there was no constructive discharge where the
change in the working conditions was justified, not pretextual. Id. at 523, 535. The employer
transferred an employee from a position as driver to a position on the loading dock, id. at 523,
because of the employee's poor driving. Id. at 535. The transfer entailed neither loss of' income nor
more burdensome working conditions. Id. Similarly, in Charles Carter & Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 37
(1978), the Board held that there was no discriminatory discharge. Id. at 90. The employer's
termination of an employee working on its construction operations did not violate § 8(a)(3) of
NLRA, the Board ruled, because, after the employee was temporarily laid off because of poor
weather conditions, the employee, in effect, quit voluntarily by failing to return to the construction
site. 236 N.L.R.B. at 40. The employer did not know that employee had joined a union or was
seeking union-scale wages. Id.
"'Goodman Lumber Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 304, 304-05 (1967) (father's attempts to carry out at
home employer's instructions to obtain son's resignation from union which led to son's "quit" held
constructive discharge).
107 Haberman, 641 F.2d at 358.
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which case they will be disregarded,'" or if the proffered reasons are bona fide. If the
proferred reasons are bona fide, then there is what is called a mixed motive situation,
that is, the employer was motivated to discharge the employee for permissible and
impermissible reasons. Courts have used several different calculations of what degree
the anti-union animus must be in proportion to the permissible motivation to find that
the employer violated the Act. ' 59
Under the Haberman formulation, where an employer imposes conditions which are
inherently destructive of employee rights, anti-union animus is presumed, and no specific
finding of discriminatory intent under the second prong of the constructive discharge
test is required."° For this presumption to operate, however, the employer's conduct
must be egregious, that is, it must directly and unambiguously penalize or deter protected
activity." L The Haberman court derived this presumption from the 1967 case of NLRB
v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. " 2 In Great Dane the United States Supreme Court, distilling
several principles from its prior decisions in section 8(a)(3) cases,"s held that if it can
reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was "'inherently
destructive' of important employee rights," no proof of anti-union animus is needed. 1 "
m8 Id.
S 0' Compare Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978) (Board
must prove that the discharge would not have occurred absent the protected activity), and Midwest
Regional Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same), with Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d
976 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Board must prove that the illegal motive partially caused the discriminatory
conduct), and Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1976) (Board must
prove that illegal motive predominated).
"{" See Haberman, 641 F.2d at 359.
"' Id. In Haberman live employees resigned in response to their employer's decision to have an
open shop and to unilaterally cease payment of union benefits. Id. at 358. The AU found, and the
Board and court of appeals affirmed, that this conduct conveyed an intent not to abide by the labor
contract. Id. The employer's conduct forced the employees to choose between quitting or continuing
work in the face of the employer's unlawful repudiation of its bargaining obligations under the
Act. Id. Thus, the ALJ found, there was a constructive discharge. Id. Even if anti-union animus
had been absent, the court of appeals stated in its decision enforcing the Board's order, there would
be a constructive discharge because the employer's actions were "inherently destructive" of employee
rights. Id. For cases involving conduct claimed to rise to the level of "inherently destructive," see,
e.g., Tricer Products, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 65, 71 (1978) (Board held that an employer constructively
discharged its employees by giving them a choice of working without union representation or
quitting, and the employees chose to quit); Superior Sprinklers, 227 N.L.R.B: 204, 207, 210, 211
(1976) (Board held that employer constructively discharged its employees by conditioning their
further employment with the company upon the employees performing nonunion work, where
employer had committed unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain collectively with the employees'
union). The Board in In re Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 10 (1937) stated: "To condition employment
upon the abandonment by employees of the rights guaranteed them by the NLRA is equivalent to
discharging them outright for union activity."
" 2 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
IS See, e.g., American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (Court held that once
an impasse was reached, an employer's use of a lockout and temporary layoff of employees to bring
economic pressure to bear in support of his bargaining position was not inherently destructive of
employee rights, since there was no showing that the lockout would necessarily destroy the union's
ability to act effectively as the employees' bargaining agent); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Co., 373 U.S.
221 (1963) (Court stated that proof of subjective intent to discriminate or to interfere with union
rights is not necessary where conduct is such that the motive can be founded upon the "inherently
discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself").
19 Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34.
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In such situations, the Court ruled, the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if
the employer raises the defense, and supports it with evidence, that the conduct was
motivated by business considerations) 15
Subsequent to the Board's Sure- Tan decision, but prior to the Supreme Court deci-
sion, the Board faced a case, La Mousse, Inc.,' R' raising the issue of constructive discharge
of illegal alien employees. This case presents an important application of the Haberman
test's first prong, whereby the employer must have created working conditions so intol-
erable that the employee is forced to quit. In La Mousse the employer ran a business
making desserts. 117 Interest in a union arose," 8 and a representation election was sched-
uled for August 31." 9 After receiving a copy of the petition for a union election, the
employer hired two attorneys from a Los Angeles law firm) 20 About a week prior to the
election, one of the attorneys made arrangements with the INS to check the employees'
immigration status)" While the employer appeared to have expressed some reservations
about following this course, she did nothing to impede the forthcoming INS raid until
the night before the raid, when the employer apparently had second thoughts. 122 On
that night she told one employee that she had received an anonymous call that the INS
would be in the area the following day and that the employee should call the other
employees and tell them not to come to work.'" Several employees conferred that
evening with a union representative, who was of the opinion that the INS would not
conduct a raid and that some other government agency was coming to check business
records. 12 ' All but two of the kitchen employees reported to work on the following
morning) 25 At 7:30 am the INS conducted a raid, and ten illegal alien employees were
voluntarily deported. 126 Noting that the attorney who made arrangements with the INS
had acted as the employer's agent, the AL] found, and the Board affirmed, that the
employer had constructively discharged the employees in violation of section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA.'" Thus in La Mousse the employer's report of her illegal alien employees to
the INS, and their resulting departure, was held to satisfy the Haberman test's first-prong
requirement of the employer creating intolerable working conditions.
In cases involving the discharge of illegal aliens, the Board has required a specific
showing of employer discriminatory intent to satisfy the Haberman second prong, and
thus, has not availed itself of the Great Dane presumption. For example, in the 1974 case
of Handling Equipment Corp., 1 " the day after the union had won an election, the employer
"5 Id. Applying this formulation, the Court found the company's refusal to pay vacation benefits
to strikers to be discrimination in its simplest form, and therefore specific proof of anti-union
animus was not required. Id.
"6 259 N.L.R.B. 37 (1981), order enf'd without opinion, 703 F.2d 576 (1983).
1'7 Id. at 39. The employer began the operation in the kitchen of her home and in a few years
moved the business to another building and employed approximately twenty persons. Id.
18 Id.
115 1d. at 40.
' 20 Id. at 39-40.
12 ' Id. at 40.
Id. at 40,45.
122 Id. at 45.
129 Id_
' 25 Id.
128 Id. at 45-46.
127 Id. at 45,51.
128 209 N.L.R.B. 64,65-66 (1974).
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discharged all alien employees without green cards. 129 In response to the claim that the
discharge was an unfair labor practice, the company argued that it had discharged
several of its illegal alien employees out of concern that the company might be violating
the law. The AL] held, and the Board affirmed, that discriminatory intent was not
sufficiently shown, even though the Board had held that the employer committed nu-
merous unfair labor practices during the course of a union election campaign.'" The
Ali found persuasive the employer's claim that its president had discussed the pending
election in the shop with a friend, and the friend told him that he might be violating
the law by employing illegal aliens."'
Similarly, the litiard dismissed a discriminatory discharge complaint two years later
in BloomlAri Textiles, Inc.'" when the evidence failed to specifically show that the employer
was motivated by anti-union animus.'" In that case the union had filed a complaint
against the employer on behalf of an illegal alien employee, who was also a union activist,
for failure to pay overtime wages that were due.'" The employer subsequently discov-
ered that the employee was probably an illegal alien. Upon being advised by its attorneys
that employment of illegal aliens was against state public policy and perhaps in violation
of state law,"5 the employer fired the illegal alien employee. The Board held that the
reason for the discharge was not the employee's protected concerted activities, but the
employer's concern that employment of illegal alien workers violated state law. 15fi Thus,
in this case, the Board ignored the possibility that the employer's firing of an illegal alien
employee shortly after he filed an unfair labor practice charge could give rise to a Great
Dane presumption of anti-union animus. Instead, the Board required a specific showing
of that discriminatory intent.
Front the Board's decisions in Handling Equipment and BloomlArt Textiles, it appears
that the Great Dane presumption has not been considered appropriate when addressing
the issue of discriminatory discharge of illegal alien employees. Thus, to be successful
in demonstrating Ihat an employer's notification to the INS is a constructive discharge,
a specific showing of anti-union animus is required. Courts' refusal to allow the Great
Dane presumption of anti-union animus to operate, as was the case in Handling Equipment
and BloomlArt Textiles, may reflect a policy that reporting illegal aliens to the INS is to
be encouraged, and should not, therefore, give rise to an inference of anti-union ani-
mus.'"
' 29 Id. at 65.
I , " Id. at 64, 66.
131 Id. at 65-66. The AL.,] took official notice of California Labor Code section 2805, an employer
sanction law, although noting that the provision had been invalidated. Id. at 66. The Board adopted
the AI J's conclusions. Id. at 64.
13'2 225 N.L.R.R. 766 (1976).
'39
	 at 769.
134 Id. at 767.
, 35 Id. at 768.
1°' Id. at 769. The Al J summarized, "in short he impressed me when testifying concerning
this facet of the case as a person who had done what he had been told was the correct thing and
who was genuinely surprised that his conduct was now being challenged." Id,
137 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit echoed this reasoning in Apollo
Tire, where it stated in dicta that absent the demonstrated intent to discriminatorily discharge an
illegal alien employee, an employer who suspects an employee is illegally present in the United
States should report this information to the INS. 604 F.2d at 1183.
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In summary, the Haberman case sets out a clear two-prong test for analyzing con-
structive discharge cases. The first prong requirement that the employer purposefully
created intolerable working conditions has been very loosely interpreted, extending in
La Mousse to an employer's arranging an INS raid to remove her illegal alien employees.
The second prong requires a specific showing that the employer acted out of anti-union
animus. Although the Haberman test endorses the use of the Great Dane presumption,
the case law shows that it is not used when illegal aliens are involved. If both anti-union
animus and legitimate motives are shown, a mixed motives analysis applies, in which
case the employer's constructive discharge of the employee violated the NLRA only if
the employer's anti-union animus outweighed his legitimate business motivation.
Once it is determined that an employer's discharge of an employee violated the
NLRA, the next issue is what remedial order the Board will issue. Ordinarily the remedy
in a discriminatory discharge situation is an order that the employer reinstate the
discharged employee with backpay. Sometimes, however, the situation makes the con-
ventional remedy inappropriate. What the Board can do under the Act, and what it does
in such situations, is the subject of the next section. This inquiry is pertinent because
the discharge of illegal alien employees will probably create special circumstances, such
as the illegal status of the employees, or their removal from the country, that will make
the conventional remedies problematic. This next section examines how the Board and
courts have responded to these situations.
C. Remedies
Subsection 1 looks at the legislative history of the remedies section of the Act, the
remedy provisions in the Act itself, and significant Supreme Court decisions which have
interpreted those provisions. This first subsection indicates that the Board has broad
remedial power under the statute in general. Subsection 2 treats the standard of judicial
review of Board remedial orders. The standard of review demonstrates the degree of
deference given by courts to the Board's orders. Subsection 3 shows how this broad
remedial power has been used by the Board and upheld by the courts in a whole range
of labor law cases. Subsection 4 examines Board remedial orders involving illegal aliens,
so as to provide a basis for analyzing the remedial orders in Sure
-Tan. Subsection 5
discusses the permissibility of conjectural backpay orders, and the various degrees of
conjecture the Board has engaged in when fashioning backpay orders.
1. The Board's Order-Making Power Under the Act
Although the legislative history of the NLRA contains little discussion of the Board's
order-making power,'" it appears that Congress recognized as vital the Board's authority
to flexibly fashion its remedial orders.'" The language of the Act is broad, stating its
'" See generally, 79 CONG. REC. 9704 (1935).
19 See, Note, The Need For Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) Of The National Labor Relations Act,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 70 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, Need For Creative Orders] (citing H.R.
REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1935) ("The orders will of course be adapted to the needs
of the individual case."); 79 CONG. REC. 6184 (1935) (speech of Senator Wagner read into the
record) ("The power of this board to issue orders is strictly limited to the preservation of the
industrial freedom guaranteed specifically by the bill."); 79 CONG. REC. 9699 (1935) (remarks of
Representative Marcantonio)).
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purposes as industrial peace,"° collective bargaining,"' and restoration of equality of
bargaining power between employer and employee. 142 Coupled with the grant of power
to the Board in section 10(c) to take any affirmative remedial action that will effectuate
these broad purposes, 13
 the language of the Act indicates that Congress intended to
endow the Board with broad remedial powers to devise remedial measures appropriate
to accomplishing the broad public goals which lay behind the enactment of the Act.
The congressional determination to draft section 10(c) in indefinite language, rather
than to formulate specific penalties for each offense, is additional evidence that the
Board is empowered to set the tenor of its own authority by imaginative and specific
treatment of the unique circumstances surrounding each unfair labor practice.'" In
1947 Congress considered amending the Act with the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA).' 45
 The House version of the LMRA would have set up an independent admin-
istrator who would issue complaints and ask the Board for specific affirmative remedial
action. 146
 Under this proposal, the Board would have been limited to granting the relief'
requested."7
 Because the administrator would determine the type of relief before the
facts were fully developed at the hearing, the type of relief would have to be preordained
by formula, and therefore, would be less adaptable to each specific situation.'" The
defeat of this House version of the LMRA reaffirmed the Congressional determination
to grant broad remedial discretion to the NLRB under section 10(c) of the original Act. 19
Supreme Court decisions support this view that the NLRA is designed for a broad
public mission, and that the Board is empowered to act accordingly. The Supreme Court
stated unequivocally in the 1940 case of Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 15'1
 that the Act creates
a scheme for the vindication of public, not private, rights."' Thirty-five years later the
Court reiterated this understanding of the Act, stating that section 7 rights are protected
"not for their own sake but as instruments of national labor policy." 152
 With this broad
mission, the Board logically should possess broad remedial powers.'"
' 4° 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) ("Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce ... by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest").
141 Id.
12 Id. For example, the policy statement speaks of safeguarding and promoting the free flow
of commerce, of restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees, and of
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and collective
representation. See id.
'" Id. at § 160(c).
144 See Note, Need for Creative Orders, supra note 139, at 70.
' 4° 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958) (Taft-Hartley Act) [hereinafter cited
as LMRA].
' 46
 See Note, Need for Creative Orders, supra note 139, at 70.
147 See id.
118 See id.
149 See id. Although the passage of the LMRA generally expressed a concern that courts were
giving too much deference to the Board's expertise, the concern-was focused on findings of fact,
not to the Board's determination of appropriate remedies. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
' 5° 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1940).
15 ' Id.
152
 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975).
' 5' See Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 194, where the Court stated:
A statute expressive of such large public policy as that on which the National Labor
Relations Board is based must be broadly phrased and necessarily carries with it the
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2. Standard of Judicial Review of Board Remedial Orders
Remedial orders require the respondent to take specified affirmative action to
dissipate the effects of the unfair labor practices. The foundation cases interpreting the
NLRA's grant of remedial power to the Board are Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB,'" Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,' 55 and NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co." 6 These cases stand for the
proposition that the Board should be allowed broad latitude in fashioning remedies.
The Court has advanced two separate rationales for why the Board should have this
broad remedial power. The first reason is tied to the concept of separation of powers.
Under this analysis, because Congress set up a special body, the NLRB, to administer
the NLRA, it is this special body, and not the courts, which should have the power to
fashion appropriate remedies under this legislation.' 57 Second, the Court has emphasized
the expertise which the Board possesses in the field of labor relations. According to the
Court, because the Board is in daily contact with the whole seemless web of labor
relations, it possesses expertise, which the courts do not share, and which the Board uses
to reach the appropriate result under the Act.'" The Seven-Up Court held that the
NLRA gives the Board freedom to attain just results in diverse and complicated situa-
tions. In the context of deciding whether a Board backpay order should be upheld, the
Seven-Up Court asserted that "the order should stand unless it can be shown that the
order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to
effectuate the policies of the Act."'"
The Phelps Dodge and Seven-Up Courts also identified limits on the Board's remedial
power, stating in the former that only actual losses should be made good, and in the
latter that the Board's orders must be functions of the purpose to be accomplished.' 6"
Moreover, the Court in Republic Steel further held that punitive orders are beyond the
authority of the Board. The case law on what constitutes a punitive order, however, is
unsettled. Courts are likely to refuse enforcement of creative orders when they are not
restitutionary, but rather serve as punishment and are not reasonably related to the
wrong,' 6 ' or are aimed at a wrong not within the Board's jurisdiction.' 6 ' This zone is
task of administrative application. There is an area plainly covered by the language
of the Act and an area no less plainly without it. But in the nature of things Congress
could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems for circumventing the policies of
the Act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate these policies
in an infinite variety of specific situations. Congress met these difficulties by leaving
the adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of administration. The exercise
of the process was committed to the Board, subject to limited judicial review.
' 51 311 U.S. 7, 8-9 (1940) (upholding Board order for reinstatement with backpay, but rejecting
further order directing company to deduct from the payments to the reinstated employees the
amounts they had received for work performed upon ''work relief projects" and to pay over such
amounts to the appropriate governmental agencies).
1 " 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1940) (upholding Board order compelling employer to offer strikers the
opportunity for employment which should not have been denied them and to make such employees
whole for loss of pay due to the discrimination).
1 " 344 U.S. 344, 346. (1953) (Board can compute backpay on basis of segregated quarterly
periods, with deductions being made from amount which would normally have been earned in a
particular quarter for amount earned by employer during that period in other employment).
'" Id.
'55 Id
' 59 Id.
l"" See, e.g., id. (Board orders must be "functions of the purpose to be accomplished").
' 6 ' See generally, T. KHEFA., supra note 4, § 1106.
"12 See Republic Steel, 311 U.S. at 8-9, where the Supreme Court struck down a Board order
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marked semantically by the use of the labels that the Board order is "punitive,"to or
"arbitrary,"Ril rather than remedial. 165
3. The Board's Creative Fashioning of Remedies
Inside the boundary of punitive orders, courts have permitted the Board wide
discretion in creatively fashioning orders," The particular fashioning of backpay orders
is often complex, due to •the many forms of section 8(a)(3) violations which employer
discrimination may entail. 167 When making backpay determinations, the Board must take
into account the period of time during which backpay will accrue and how the dollar
amount is to be calculated. The general rule is that backpay may be awarded from the
time of the discriminatory action to the time a proper reinstatement offer is made. 168
The Board has included lost fringe benefits''''' and interest payments 17° in its backpay
calculations. Under some special circumstances, furthermore, the Board may fashion a
different timetable suitable to the facts of the particular case.rn
The Board has also fashioned creative remedial orders for section 8(0(1) 172 and
8(a)(2) violations. 17 ' In the section 8(a)(2)' 71 area the Board has created a distinction
that required the employer to pay the government the expenses that it had incurred as a result of
hiring the affected employees in work-relief programs. The Court noted that the order was not
directed to the appropriate goal of effectuating the policies of the Act, but rather to a distinct and
broader policy with respect to unemployment, i.e., reimbursing communities and governments for
expenses incurred in connection with work-relief programs. Id. at 13.
16i See Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961) (where
union was found to have violated NLRA by enforcing closed shop preferential hiring conditions,
Board order compelling union to refund dues collected from employees in the "closed shop" held
to be, when lacking further evidentiary support, not remedial, but punitive, and thus beyond the
competence of the Board to issue).
NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403, 409 (2d Cir. 1958) (reimbursement remedy
deemed inappropriate and arbitrary"). See also Buncher v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828 (1960), where judge Van Dusen, dissenting, argued that the seniority
system adopted by the Board was arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore the order of a sub-
stantial award by it was punitive rather than remedial. The finding of a violation of § 8(a)(3) "proves
only that some backpay is owed; if the precise amount cannot be determined, the Board's approx-
imation must still have a rational basis. This basis for the backpay does not become more rational
because the trial examiner rejects some of the employer's evidence as subjective and self-serving."
Id. at 792 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
1 " Id.
' 6fi See generally T. KNEEL, supra note 4, § 1106.
' 67
 See infra text accompanying notes 172-83.
Richard W. Kaase Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1967); Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1060).
'"" See generally -1.  KHEEI., supra note 4, § 7.04121 at 7-156.
17° See id.
171 See id. In calculating backpay, the Board has divided the calendar year into four quarters.
F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289, 293 (1950). Backpay is computed on the basis of loss in each
quarter, id., that is, the dollar amount the employee would have earned but for the discriminatory
conduct, minus the net earnings from any job performed in that quarter. Id.
472 For text of § 8(a)(1), see supra note 3.
"'See I). Box, A. Cox, & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 253-54 (1981)
(discussion of J.P. Stevens & Co. unfair labor practice litigation). See also Comment, Toward Remedying
Deliberate Unfair Practices Under Section 8(a) Of The KIRA: An Inquiry Into The Pathology Of The Willful
Violator, 17 UCLA L. REV. 602 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Remedying Deliberate Unfair
Practices].
04 8(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:
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between employer domination of unions and employer assistance or interference with
unions)Th In the former the Board orders the complete disestablishment of a union so
it can never be certified by the Board, 176 but in the latter orders the employer to withold
recognition from the assisted but undominated union until the union receives Board
certification.'"
The Board has equally applied its ingenuity and broad remedial power for violations
of the duty to bargain in good faith under section 8(a)(5).' 78 For example, the Board
may issue bargaining orders against an employer who succeeds to all the rights and
powers of the previous unionized employer," and against an employer who moves his
business to another location for anti-union purposes.'" A bargaining order may also
issue where it is found that the employer has committed unfair labor practices that are
so serious that it is impossible to hold a fair election.'"
The Board has creatively effectuated other parts of the Act as well. The Board's
Excelsior rule)82 requiring that the employer give lists of employees' names and addresses
to the union for use in sending them information, shows the Board's creative approach
to effectuating the policy of the Act of employee free choice of whether to unionize.
Similarly, the Board has expansively interpreted its power to serve the objective of
employee free choice by requiring employers to grant access to nonemployee union
solicitors where union access to disseminate information to employees is infeasible)"
This subsection has shown that the NLRB has many times creatively used its broad
remedial power to effectuate the purposes of the Act. In these situations the Board has
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — (2) to dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
or other support to it: Provided, That ... an employer shall not be prohibited from
permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time
or pay.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
177 See NLRB v. United Mine Workers, 355 U.S. 453, 458-59 (1958); NLRB v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 266 (1937). The basis for the distinction is that, in the Board's
judgment, the free choice by employees of an agent capable of acting as their true representative,
in the case of a dominated union, is improbable under any circumstances, white the free choice of
an assisted but undominated union, capable of acting as their true representative, is a reasonable
possibility after the effects of the employer's unfair labor practices have dissipated.
178 See NLRB v. United Mine Workers, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958).
177 Id. at 459.
178 See generally T. KNEEL, supra note 4, § 7.0412].
'" See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1969).
187 See, e.g., Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 665, 667 (1965) (requiring an employer to bargain
with the union at its new location even if the evidence discloses that the union only represents a
small minority of the employees at that location).
lin See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
In Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1238-40 (1966); see also NLRB v. Wyman
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 762-66 (1969).
185 See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956), where the Court held
"when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-employees
to communicate with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has
been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information on the right
to organize."
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assessed the particular circumstances of the case which call for specially adapted reme-
dies. The next subsection considers the Board's use of its remedial power when illegal
aliens are involved.
4. Board Orders Involving Illegal Alien Employees
It is clear that the Board's ability and practice of creatively fashioning remedial
orders is also applied in cases dealing with illegal alien employees. In the 1976 case of
Amoy's Bakery & Noodle 'Co., 184 for example, the Board held that the employer had
discriminatorily discharged illegal aliens in violation of section 8(a)(3), and ordered
reinstatement with full backpay. 199 The company had argued that an order of reinstate-
ment with backpay would be improper because it would.require the company to violate
California Labor Code section 2805(a),'" which prohibited an employer from knowingly
employing an alien not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employ-
ment adversely affected employment of lawful resident workers. 187 The Board disagreed
because section 2805(a) was presently invalid.'" Section 2805(a) had been challenged
before the United States Supreme Court, which remanded the case back to the California
courts to resolve questions of construction which would determine the constitutionality
of the statute.'" Reinstatement with backpay, the Board reasoned, thus would not place
the company in violation of any valid state statute.'" Rather, the Board explained, the
remedy would return the company to the position in which it had placed itself earlier
by hiring illegal aliens, and in which, but for the illegal discharges, it would still be. 191
The Board added, however, that if section 2805 were finally held enforceable the
company could petition for modification of the order at the compliance stage.' 92
184 227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976).
' 85 Id. at 219.
186 1d. at 214.
187 Id.
189
	 at 215.
"9 See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). Section 2805(a) was held unconstitutional in
Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal. App. 3d 673, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1974).
194 Amay's, 227 N.L.R.B. at 215.
191 Id.
192 Id. The Ninth Circuit in Apollo Tire, having found the company to have discriminatorily
discharged its illegal alien employees, also confronted the effect of section 2805 on its remedial
order. 604 F.2d at 1184. In Apollo Tire the court ruled that if section 2805 were subsequently held
to be enforceable, the company could petition for modification of the reinstatement order. Id. Once
the INS has begun deportation proceedings, however, reinstatement orders are apparently imper-
missible under a later Ninth Circuit case which distinguished Apollo Tire. See Rodriguez-Gonzalez
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 640 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1981). In Rodriguez-Gonzalez, five
aliens sought review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals finding them deportable.
Id. at 1140-41. The immigration judge had rejected an offer of proof that Vogue Co., the employer
of the aliens and the place where they were arrested, and the INS had agreed to interrogate, arrest,
and commence deportation proceedings against the alien employees in retaliation for union activities
by the aliens. Id. at 1140. The aliens argued that they should not be deportable because that would
violate the public policy of protecting the exercise of NLRA rights. Id. The court affirmed the ALl's
rejection of the offer of proof. Id. at 1142. Distinguishing Apollo Tire, the court stated that when
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The Board in Arnay's considered the effect of the aliens' illegal immigration status,
but asserted that its broad remedial power could redistribute the risks for the employer
and the employees hack to the status quo ante. The Board also recognized, however,
that if section 2805 were subsequently held enforceable, the balance of risks of detection
for the employees and sanctions for the employer might change. To allow for this
possibility, the Board creatively molded its order to allow future petition for modification.
Similarly, five years later in La Mousse, the Board ordered reinstatement with backpay
to illegal alien employees who had been constructively discharged by an INS raid which
the employer had arranged. In this case several of the employees who had accepted
voluntary deportation reentered the country illegally, appeared at the employer's prem-
ises, and were permitted to vote in the representation election, under challenge)" Of
seventeen employees eligible to vote, ten ballots were cast. The ALI found that the
Union had obtained an authorization card majority of ten out of seventeen employees
in the proposed unit)", and that the employer's unfair labor practices were so pervasive
as to preclude the holding of a fair election, The Board issued a bargaining order,' 97
even though the majority of the employees were illegal aliens who had been recently
deported. LOS
A third case involving illegal aliens shows another use of the Board's remedial power.
In the 1984 case of Sun Country Citrus, Inc.,"" a citrus packing plant was facing a union
certification drive. 2" The employer raised the issue of immigration status with one
employee, saying that without proper immigration papers the union might not let her
vote."' The Board adopted the ALls finding that the employer's statement was a thinly
veiled threat to notify the INS in order to dissuade the employee from supporting the
union.202 The Board ordered the employer to post a notice stating that it would not
threaten to notify the INS in order to dissuade employees from supporting a labor
organization. 203
This section has shown that the Board's creative application of its remedial powers
does not end simply because illegal aliens are involved. On the contrary, the Board has
recognized that these cases merit special attention to the particular facts. If the illegal
alien employees have been discharged in violation of the Act, and as a result are removed
from the country, the question arises whether the Board's remedial power would encom-
the INA makes an immigrant deportable, the INS enforcement officials cannot terminate proceed-
ings on grounds not specified by the INA. Id. Thus, the court ruled, Apollo Tire's finding that illegal
alien employees possess NLRA rights does not preempt their deportahility. Id. at 1142 11.3.
'" La Mousse, 259 N.L.R.B. at 48.
194 Id,
195 id.
,"" Id.
197 Id.
LOS Id.
'"''Sun Country Citrus, Inc:, 268 N.L.R.B. 700 (1984).
2*0 Id. at 702.
I"' Id. at 708.
2"2 Id. at 700, 708.
214 Id. at 709. See also Hasa Chemical, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 903 (1978), where the Board ordered
the employer to cease and desist from threatening to call the INS in retaliation for illegal alien
employees engaging in protected union activity. Id. at 913.
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pass a minimum backpay order. The next section examines whether such an order is
within the Board's remedial power.
5. The Permissibility of Conjectural Backpay Awards
In Sure-Tan the court of appeals issued a minimum backpay order, that is, the order
provided that each constructively discharged illegal alien employee would receive back-
pay for at least six months on the ground that six months was a reasonable assumption
as to the minimum time the alien employees would have remained employed without
apprehension by the I NS, but for the employer's unfair labor practice. 204 Other than in
Sure-Tan the Board and courts have never ordered a minimum backpay award. A
minimum backpay order involves conjecture; in order to evaluate the appropriateness
of a minimum backpay award, this section examines other types of conjectural backpay
awards.
When making conjectural backpay awards, the Board has first concluded that there
was not any more precise manner of calculating backpay available. 21 ' The Board also
has provided an opportunity for the employer to present an alternative formula and
mitigating evidence. 2°6 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's directive207 that the
Board must take into account the particular circumstances of a case in order to avoid
remedies which are oppressive or are not calculated to effectuate a policy of the Act. 206
These principles limiting the scope of the Board's fashioning conjectural backpay
awards are illustrated in NLRB v. Superior Roofing Co., 2°9 where an employee was discri-
minatorily dismissed as the Company's second senior roofer. His replacement worked
only nineteen hours before being legitimately replaced. 21 ° The company argued that
nineteen hours should be the amount of backpay earnings awarded, since the company
had no seniority system.2 " The Board fashioned a seniority formula of its own to
compute the earnings of a representative employee, which it then used to compute the
backpay award .212 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced
the backpay order, stating that the Board has wide discretion in selecting criteria for
reconstructing what would have happened in a given case but for the discrimination. 213
Here, the court held, the seniority formula was a rationally permissible device in fash-
ioning a backpay remedy. 2 t 4 The court reached this decision because there was an absence
204 Sure-Tan, 672 F.2d at 606.
2" See infra text accompanying notes 209-20.
206 See infra text accompanying notes 215, 220.
267 NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
205 Id. at 349. See also Republic Steel, 31 1 U.S. at 11-12, where the court stated:
This language should be construed in harmony with the spirit and remedial purposes
of the Act. We do not think that Congress intended to vest in the Board a virtually
unlimited discretion to devise punitive measures, and thus to prescribe penalties or
fines which the Board may think would effectuate the policies of the Act .... We have
said that the power to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive.
209 460 F.2d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1972).
212 Id. at 1240.
2 " Id.
212 Id. at 1241.
2131d.
214 Id.
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of other objective criteria for the Board to use, the formula was a reasonable approxi-
mation of what the employee would have made but for the discrimination, and because
the employer failed to come forward to present evidence mitigating liability. 2"
Similarly, in Buncher v. NLRB 216 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit enforced a backpay order for a discriminatorily discharged employee, where the
backpay was calculated by a seniority formula fashioned by the General Counsel and
approved by the Board, even though the employer did not have a formal seniority
system.217 The Board had affirmed the ALJ's decision to use the remedy on the ground
that since the employer's proposed formula had been discredited by the ALJ as a
contrivance to avoid backpay liability, it was impossible to determine precisely the amount
of backpay, and so the reasonable formula of the General Counsel would be used. 2 I 6
The court of appeals enforced the order,- finding the application of a seniority rule not
arbitrary or unreasonable in light of the fact that seniority was a factor in the company's
employment policy, and is a general industrial practice. 2 ' 9 In enforcing the order the
court emphasized that the company had been given and availed itself of the opportunity
to present a different scheme to calculate backpay, but that it had failed to supply
credible evidence to support the scheme. 22°
While in many cases it may be difficult to determine precisely the amount of backpay
due in discriminatory discharge situations, the Superior Roofing and Buncher cases dem-
onstrate that when such difficulties arise the Board will approximate the amount owed
by fashioning a reasonable formula. In these cases, however, the Board engaged in such
conjecture only after determining that no more precise manner of calculating backpay
would work, and after allowing the employer to present an alternative formula and
mitigating evidence. These are limits imposed by the Board itself, however, and so do
not necessarily mark the limits of conjectural remedies that the NLRA empowers the
Board to issue.
II. SURE-TAN: PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Part II examines the procedural history of Sure-Tan and the decision of the Supreme
Court. Subsection A examines the decisions of the administrative law judge and the
Board. Subsection B then treats the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. Subsection C sets forth the decision of the United States Supreme
Court, and subsections D and E look at the concurring and dissenting opinions of that
decision.
In Sure- Tan, after an employer's employees elected a union as their collective bar-
gaining representative, the employer informed the INS that some of its employees were
illegal aliens. As a result, the INS raided the workplace, and the illegal alien employees
were sent out of the country, back to Mexico. In response, the Union brought unfair
labor practice charges against the employer. The proceedings that followed raised three
discreet questions: first, whether the illegal aliens were "employees" within the meaning
215 Id,
216 405 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1968) (rehearing en banc).
217 Id. at 789, 791.
219
219 Id. at 789-91.
22n Id. at 790.
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of the NLRA; second, whether the illegal aliens had been constructively discharged in
violation of the NLRA; and third, what remedy would be appropriate and permissible.
A. Proceedings Before the NLRB
The Board's Regional Director issued unfair labor practices complaints against the
employer Sure-Tan, which were heard by an ALI"' In his decision, the ALJ assumed
it to be a basic premise that illegal alien workers are employees within the NLRA. 222 'The
Aq found that the employer knew that most of its employees were illegal aliens, 223 that
the letter by the president of Sure-Tan to the INS was prompted by the employees'
selection of a union,224 and that sending the letter was the proximate cause of the
deportation of the five employees. 223 Thus, the ALJ concluded, there was a constructive
discharge in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (3).226 The Board affirmed and adopted
these findings and conclusions. 227
In determining what remedy should be ordered, the ALJ found that under past
Board precedent228 no backpay remedy was available, reasoning that the constructively
discharged employees were physically unavailable for work because of their forced
removal to Mexico. 229 To compensate for these remedial deficiencies, the mi recom-
mended that the Board issue a reinstatement order allowing six months for the employ-
ees to return to the United States and accept reinstatement. 23" The Aq felt six months
was a necessary and sufficient period of time to allow the employees to initiate procedures
for legal reentry into the United States."'
Moreover, because the lack of backpay would most likely mean that the employer
would benefit from his unfair labor practice, the Aq invited the Board to make an
exception to its normal rule regarding tolling of backpay by awarding backpay for a
minimum four week period both to provide some measure of relief to the illegally
discharged employees and to deter future violations of the NLRA. 232 The ALI urged
this exception because the violations would otherwise go largely unremedied, 233 thus
allowing an employer to adopt "an apparently foolproof system" of defeating union
22 ' Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1188 (1978).
222
	 at 1192.
222 Id.
22• Id.
222 Id. at 1191.
226 1d. at 1192.
227 id.
229 Id. at 1193. The ALJ relied on several cases for tolling hackpity: MSW Construction, Inc. d/
b/a Hale & Sons Construction, 219 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1079 (1975) (incarcerated); Gifford-Hill & Co.,
Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. 337, 338 (1971) (incarcerated); Rice Lake Creamery Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1113,
1115 & n.10 (1965), dissenting viewplini aff'd., 365 F.2d 888, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (employee moved
from area and no longer in labor market); Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 748, 750
(1962) (employer not available because of illness); John David Brock, d/b/a J.D. Brock et al., 42
N.L.R.B. 457, 468-69 (1942) (armed forces).
229 234 N.L.R.B. at 1192.
2s6 Id.
2" Id.
252 Id. at 1193.
255 Id.
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organizing attempts. 234 The ALJ concluded that a minimum hackpay award would thus
effectuate the policies of the NLRA while also accommodating the INA. 233
The Board modified the ALJ's proposed order, finding his analysis of the remedial
issue "unnecessarily speculative." 236 The Board reasoned that the ALJ's recommendation
that the offer of reinstatment be kept open for six months, as well as his failure to
recommend an award of backpay, were premised upon the employees' unavailability for
work, even though there was no evidence that the employees had not already returned,
legally, to the United States. 237 The Board therefore ordered the conventional remedy
of reinstatement with backpay, 238 purposefully leaving for future resolution in compli-
ance proceedings matters pertaining to the availability of the employees. 239
B. United Slates Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
On review of the petition for enforcement, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit first held that illegal alien employees are employees within the
NLRA.24° In next deciding whether a constructive discharge has occurred, the court of
appeals applied the Haberman 24" test. Under the first prong of this test, the court found
that the respondent's conduct was the proximate cause of the alien employees' depar-
ture. 242
 The court found "specious" the employer's argument that it was the employees'
illegal status, not the employer's conduct, which created any intolerable working condi-
tions. 243 Thus, the employer's notification to INS satisfied Haberman's first-prong require-
ment that the employer purposefully create intolerable working conditions.
234 Id.
295 Id.
2" Id. at 1187.
29 7 Id.
2" Id.
23
 Id. The Board directed that calculation of backpay in the compliance proceeding would be
in the manner prescribed in F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950). Sure-Tan, 234 N.L.R.B.
at 1188. The General Counsel subsequently filed a motion for clarification with the Board, sug-
gesting that the Board's order might violate the national immigration laws and policies and therefore
should be modified so that reinstatement would be conditioned on legal reentry into the United
States, and backpay would accrue only from time of legal reentry. Sure-Tan Inc., and Surak Leather
Co., 246 N.L,R,B, 788, 788 (1979). The Board, two members dissenting, denied the motion, finding
that the usual procedures governing the reinstatement and backpay claims would best effectuate
the remedial policies of the Act. Id. at 788-89. The Board did state that although it had ordered
unconditional reinstatement, hackpay would be tolled while the alien employees were out of the
country. Id. at 788.
290 NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 198'2). The court expressly followed
its previous holding in NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355, 350 (7th Cir. 1978).
211 Sure-Tan, 672 F.2c1 at 600. As discussed supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text, Haber-
man, 641 F.2d at 358, sets out a test for constructive discharge. The test requires two elements to
establish a constructive discharge in violation of section 8(a)(3). First, one must demonstrate that
the employer's conduct created intolerable working conditions which resulted in the employee's
departure. 672 F.2d at 600. Second, one must show that the employer's conduct was motivated by
anti-union animus. Id. at 600-01. Under the second prong, proof of anti-union motive is not
required if the employer's conduct is inherently destructive of employee rights, thereby giving rise
to the Great Dane presumption of anti-union animus. Id. at 601 n.15.
242 672 F.2d at 601.
249 Id.
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As to the second prong of the Haberman test, the court found the anti-union animus
requirement "flagrantly met." 244 The employer argued that it would have engineered
the employees' departure by informing the INS even absent its anti-union animus. 245
Rejecting this, the court held that the employer failed to support its contention that the
moral obligation to help enforce the law overrode the presence of anti-union animus.
Even though the court considered the employer's conduct to have created a presumption
of anti-union animus by virtue that the employer's conduct was "inherently destructive
of employee rights," the court decided not to rely on this Great Dane presumption as an
alternative means of finding anti-union animus under the second prong of the Haberman
test. 24 6 The court explained that notwithstanding the attractiveness of relying on the
Great Dane presumption, it would refrain from doing so, as a matter of judicial prudence
in a case of first impression."' After finding anti-union animus capable of supporting a
section 8(a)(3) violation, the court held that the employer had violated the NLRA by
constructively discharging its illegal alien employees. 248
The court, however, modified the Board's order with respect to remedies. 24g The
employer argued that the Board's conventional remedies would encourage illegal im-
migration. 25° Although the court was not convinced by this argument, 25 I the court con-
ditioned reinstatement on legal presence in the United States in order to remind the
discharged employees that their eligibility for reinstatement was conditioned on being
legally present in the United States and legally free to be employed. 252 The court also
concluded that the period of time reinstatement offers would be left open should be
increased to four years in order to allow reasonable time for legal reentry to the United
States.'"
With respect to backpay, the court ruled that the discharged employees would be
deemed unavailable for work — thereby tolling backpay 254 — while they were illegally
present and not entitled to be employed in the United States. 2" Recognizing that this
conventional analysis would effectively deprive the illegal aliens of much of a remedy,
the court decided that setting a six month minimum amount of backpay would better
effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act. 256
244 Id.
245 Id. at 601 n.13.
245 Id. at 601 n. 15. For a discussion of the Great Dane presumption, see supra notes 113-15 and
accompanying text.
247 672 F.2d at 601 n.15.
24 ' Id, at 602.
249 Id. at 606.
250 Id. at 605.
25 ' Id. at 606.
252 Id. at 605-06.
2" Id. at 606. In addition the court required that the reinstatement offers be written in Spanish,
and delivered to allow for verification of receipt. Id.
254 Thus, under the Court's ruling, backpay would not accrue during the tolling period.
255
 Id. at 606.
256 Id. The court at first did not set a specific minimum amount of backpay, but rather granted
leave to the Board to modify, if the Board saw fit, the order by setting a six month backpay
minimum award. Id. The Board submitted a proposed final judgment order incorporating the six
month minimum backpay award. See Sure- Tan, 104 S. Cr. at 2808 n.4. Upon reviewing the proposed
order the court was uncertain whether the Board had in fact adopted its suggestion and so modified
its order to make clear that the employees were entitled to the six month minimum backpay award.
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C. United States Supreme Court Decision: Explication of Majority Opinion
After granting the petition for writ of certiorari, 267 the Supreme Court first held
that the Board's interpretation of the NLRA as applying to unfair labor practices com-
mitted against illegal alien workers would be upheld if it met the "reasonably defensible"
standard of review.258 The Court reasoned that this deferential standard should apply
to the Board's interpretation because Congress has assigned primarily to the Board the
task of defining "employee," 259 and because the Board has consistently held that illegal
alien workers are "employees" within section 2(3) of the Act: 259
The Court found the Board's interpretation of who constitutes an employee under
the Act reasonably defensible. 26 ' The Court noted that section 2(3) states that the Act
applies to "any employee."262 The Court stated that this language of the definition of
employee is of "striking" breadth. 253 Coupled with this broad inclusive definition in the
Act, the Court noted, the Act sets out specific exclusions. 264 Since illegal aliens are not
within these few specific exclusions, the Court concluded, they are plainly within the
meaning of "employee" in the Act. 265
In addition to this statutory analysis, the Court found that the inclusion of illegal
aliens as protected employees furthers the purposes of the NLRA. 266 The avowed pur-
pose of the Act, the Court noted, is to encourage and protect the collective bargaining
process. 257 The Court recalled its discussion in DeCanas v. Bica268 of the impact illegal
aliens have on the labor market.269 In DeCanas, the Court had asserted that the acceptance
of substandard wages and working conditions by illegal aliens depressed the wages and
working conditions in the labor market for everyone. 270 Thus, the Sure -Tan Court ex-
Id. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, with three judges dissenting. 677 F.2d 584 (7th
Cir. 1982).
267 460 U.S. 1021 (1983).
258
 104 S. Ct. 2803, 2809 (1984). See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496-97
(1979); NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963). See supra notes
241-45 and accompanying text.
259 104 S. Ct. at 2808-09 (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944)).
26" Id. at 2808 (citing to Duke City Lumber Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 53 (1980); Apollo Tire Co., 236
N.L.R.B. 1627 (1978), enf 'd, 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979); Hasa Chem., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 903
(1978); Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 138 (1977), enf'd, 583 F.2d 355 (7th
Cir. 1978); Array's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976)). See supra notes 49-65 and
accompanying text.
281
 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
262 id.
269 Id .
2" Id. See supra note 2 for text of § 2(3) of the Act.
2" 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
266 Id.
2" Id. The Court cited to NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126 (1944).
268 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
269 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
278 Id. (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976)). See Comment, illegal Immigration:
Employer Sanctions and Related Proposals, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 149, 154-55 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Employer Sanctions], which presents recent studies supporting this view. For example,
a study of 59,728 INS apprehensions during 1977-1978 indicated that 79% of the undocumented
workers earned more than the minimum wage. Id. at 154 n.29. But see, Kutchins and Tweedy, supra
note 44, at 344-46 (1983). According to these two commentators, there is no evidence that undo-
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plained, the exclusion of illegal aliens from NLRA coverage would create a subclass of
workers not having a comparable stake in improving wages and working conditions of
their legally present co-workers, thereby eroding employee unity in a given workplace,
and impeding effective collective bargaining."' Conversely, the Court concluded, the
inclusion of illegal aliens within NLRA coverage would protect the working conditions
of citizens and legally present aliens. 272
The Court also found that the inclusion of illegal aliens within the NLRA does not
directly conflict with the INA. 273 The Court determined that the employment relationship
between an employer and an illegal alien is not illegal under the INA. 274 The Court
again noted that in DeCanas 275 the Court had found that the INA has at best a peripheral
concern with employment of illegal entrants. 2" Moreover, the Court noted that the INA
explicitly exempts an employer's hiring of illegal aliens from the criminal prohibition on
harboring illegal aliens under the statute. 277 In addition, the Court emphasized that to
date Congress has clearly decided not to make it a separate criminal offense for an illegal
alien to accept employment. 278
Moreover, the Court continued, the application of the NLRA to illegal aliens is
clearly reconcilable with and furthers the policies of the INA. 279 The Court stressed that
a primary purpose of the INA is to preserve jobs for American workers. 28° Application
of the NLRA, the Court stated, will lessen an employer's incentive to hire illegal aliens
when there is no advantage under the NLRA in hiring them."' As employer demand
cumenterl workers take any significant number of jobs from American workers. Id. at 344. The vast
majority of positions held by undocumented workers are low-paying, have unattractive working
conditions, and have minimal opportunity for advancement. Id. These positions constitute a sec-
ondary labor market thoroughly unattractive to legal workers. Id.
271 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
272 See id.
27, Id. at 2809-10. During its proceedings the Board asserted that it could leave off examining
any conflict between the INA and the application of the NLRA to illegal aliens until compliance
proceedings. Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 788, 788-89 (1979). The Board's
duty to consult the INA as a source of policy in unfair labor practice proceedings, however, is clear
from Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942), which held that the Board is not
empowered by § 10(c) of the Act to order reinstatement of seamen who were discharged for striking
on board their ship, such strike constituting a mutiny in criminal violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 292-93
(1982). 316 U.S. at 40. The Southern Steamship Court ruled that the Board may not ignore the
congressional mandate that the seamen's conduct was to be punished as mutiny. Id. at 46-48. The
Court summarized the Board's duty in such a situation:
[T]he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Rela-
tions Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important
congressional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of congressional purpose calls
for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much
to demand of an administrative body that it undertake this accommodation without
excessive emphasis upon its immediate task.
Id. at 47.
'" 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
2" 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
2" 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
277 Id, at 2801. The harboring exemption is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (1982).
278
	
S. Ct. at 2809. An employer sanction amendment was extensively debated in 1952
congressional debates when the INA was recodified. See infra notes 380-81.
279 104 S. Ct. at 2810.
250 Id.
2s'
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for illegal aliens falls, the Court explained, there will be a corresponding decrease in the
incentive for aliens to enter the United States in violation of immigration laws. 282
 The
goals of the INA, the Court concluded, will thereby be served. 283
The Court then held that the employer Sure-Tan had constructively discharged its
illegal alien employees in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by reporting them to
the INS in retaliation for voting for the Union. 284
 The Court approved the Board's long
held test282
 requiring a finding of anti-union animus and a determination that the
employer acted purposefully to create working conditions so intolerable that the em-
ployee had no option but to resign. 23° Regarding the first part of the test, the Court
noted that the employer did not contest the lower court's finding that the anti-union
animus element of the test was "flagrantly met." 287
 As to the other prong of the test —
that the employer created intolerable working conditions that forced the departure of
the employees — the Court rejected the employer's argument that the workers' illegal
status and not their report to the INS was the proximate cause of the employees'
departure. 2" The Court stated that the evidence supported the ALJ's finding that the
employer's report to the INS was the "but for" cause of the departure, and that the
employer foresaw the precise result of its conduct. 285
The Court asserted, however, that to find illegal aliens to have been constructively
discharged, a specific finding of anti-union animus is necessary:29° The Court reasoned
that because reporting of violations of the criminal laws is usually to be encouraged, 293
adding the requirement of a specific finding of anti-union animus harmonizes the INA
with the finding of a constructive discharge under the NLRA. 292
Because the reporting of any violation of criminal laws should be encouraged, the
Court stated, situations where an employer's notification of the INS results in departure
of its illegal alien employees may present a mixed motive situation when anti-union
animus is established. Under the well established mixed motive analysis, 293 the Court
282 Id. One commentator disagrees with the theory that extending NLRA protection will effec-
tuate policies of immigration laws. See Casenote, Illegal Aliens in Certification Elections, supra note 51,
at 753. This casenote argues that illegal aliens will continue to fear detection and deportation and
so will not join unions anyway. Id. at 753 nn.45-46. Application of the NLRA to illegal aliens,
therefore, will have little effect on illegal immigration. Id. at 753-54.
gas
	 S. Ct. at 2809.
2" Id. at 2810-12.
285 Id. at 2810. The Court cited several cases, each articulating the test as set out in Haberman,
641 F.2d at 358.
"" 104 S. Ct. at 2810.
587 Id.
288
289 Id. at 2810-11.
29° id. at 2811. The Court noted that in Bloom/Art Textiles, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 766, 769 (1976),
the Board also stated this limitation. 104 S. Ct. at 2811. Although the court of appeals in Sure- Tan
had stated that the Haberman test was satisfied by its finding of anti-union animus, it nevertheless
considered the employer's conduct to be inherently destructive of employee rights. Sure-Tan, 672
1 7.2d at 601 n.15, The lower court had noted that under the constructive discharge test if the
employer's conduct was "inherently destructive of employee rights" anti-union animus would be
presumed and no specific finding would be required to hold the discharge discriminatory. The
Supreme Court in Sure-Tan apparently rejected this without explicitly discussing the point. 104 S.
Ct. at 2811.
211
 104 S. Ct. at 2811 (citing In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895)).
2112
2119 Id. at 281 1 n.6.
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explained, if the legitimate motive was pretext, the nature of the pretext is immateria1, 294
even if the action taken is praiseworthy, or involves a reliance on state or local laws. 2"
The Court further added that even a good faith, that is, not pretextual, motive, may not
be an absolute defense to a finding of constructive discharge. 296
After affirming the lower court's finding regarding the meaning of employee297 and
constructive discharge299 under the NLRA, the Court examined the remedies which had
been awarded by the Board and court of appeals. 299 Before discussing the employer's
challenge to the court of appeals' remedial order, the Court reaffirmed its often repeated
tenet that the Board has primary responsibility and broad discretion in devising reme-
dies."°
294 Id. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401 (1983) (where anti-
union animus is actual contributing cause of discharge of an employee, presence of mixed motives
is not a defense unless that other motive would have resulted in the discharge by itself).
295 104 S. Ct at 2811 n.6. See New Foodland, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 418 (1973). In this case a Las
Vegas, Nevada grocery and liquor store was held to have violated section 8(a)(3) by discriminatorily
discharging an underage employee. Id. at 419, 421. The store employed a minor as cashier and
stockperson, a position where she might handle liquor. Id. at 418. The Nevada Code and Las Vegas
ordinance restricted the handling of liquor by minors. Id. at 420. The employer hired her knowing
that she was a minor. Id. at 420. After she joined the union at the store, the employer said he could
no longer afford her at union rates and discharged her. Id. at 419. He claimed he discharged her
to comply with the law restricting minors from handling liquor. Id. at 419, 420. The ALJ stated
that the reliance on local law was pretext. Id. at 420. The Board ordered reinstatement with backpay,
noting that the local laws posed no obstacles to this remedy because the employee had since turned
twenty-one. Id. at 421.
296 104 S. Ct. at 2811 n.6. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). In Erie Resistor,
the employer offered super-seniority to strike replacements. Id. at 223. The Supreme Court upheld
the Board's analysis that there was a violation of section 8(a)(3) because the business purpose of the
super-seniority system did not. outweigh its harmful impact on interests of employees in concerted
activity which the employer must have foreseen and intended. Id. at 236-37.
297 104 S. Ct. at 2808-10.
299 Id. at 2810-12. The Court completely rejected petitioners' argument, based on the Court's
recent decision in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc, v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), that petitioners'
first amendment right to petition the government for redress barred a finding of unfair labor
practice. 104 S. Ct. at 2811-12. The Court explained that whereas in Bill Johnson's Restaurants there
was an actual injury which the State had an interest in redressing, in Sure- Tan petitioners did not
contact the INS to redress wrongs committed against them. Id. at 2812. Cf. California Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 516 (1972) (cause of action found to exist where trucking
company filed civil suit claiming competitor violated Clayton Act by concerted action to institute
state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat applications to acquire operating rights or to
transfer or register those rights). The Sure- Tan Court noted that the employer Sure-Tan had not
suffered significant injury at the hands of its employees. 104 S. Ct. at 2812. The Court further
deemed the Bill Johnson's Restaurants analysis inapplicable by upholding its past determination that
private persons have no judicially cognizable interest in procuring enforcement of the immigration
laws. Id. Cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973) (class action by mothers to enjoin
failure of prosecution of the fathers of their children for violation of law that married parents must
support their children dismissed for lack of standing). Moreover, the Court continued, Bill Johnson's
Restaurants involved federalism concerns of allowing states to provide civil remedies for conduct
touching deeply rooted local interests, whereas in Sure -Tan there was no asserted state interest. 104
S. Ct. at 2812.
299
 104 S. Ct. at 2812.
"° Id. See, e.g., NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 262-63 (1969); Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp, v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 194 (1941).
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The Court held that the court of appeals had erred by modifying the Board's order
and expanding the reinstatement period from six months to four years ) 0 E The Court
similarly held that the court of appeals erred in substituting its own judgment for the
Board's discretion by ordering a minimum six month backpay award, instead of re-
manding the case to the Board with instructions to reformulate the remedy, as is usual
practice. 302 The Court further asserted, in dicta, that the Board itself could not order a
minimum award not based on a record of actual evidence of the particular circumstances
of the individual employees." Section 10(c) of the Act," the Court explained, requires
that a remedy be "sufficiently tailored" to the unfair labor practice it is intended to
redress." Applying that principle to the backpay remedy, the Court stated that "suffi-
ciently tailored" means that a backpay remedy must be fashioned on "concrete
evidence"" and designed to expunge only the actual, not speculative, consequences of
the unfair labor practices. 307 The Court concluded that a minimum required award not
based on a record is speculative, and therefore is impermissible under the Act."
The Court ruled that the court of appeals was correct, however, in conditioning
offers of reinstatement on the employees' legal reentry into the country." This holding,
the Court explained, is necessary to avoid a potential conflict with the INA. 3 " Similarly,
the Court ruled that in computing any backpay, the employees must be deemed un-
available for work, thereby tolling backpay, during any period the employees were not
lawfully present and entitled to be employed in the United States. 3 "
The Court remanded the case to the Board, stressing that subsequent compliance
hearings, where the Board would employ its expertise, 312 are the place to decide what,
if any, backpay is appropriate. 3 " The Court noted the probable unavailability of any
reinstatement or backpay remedy. 3 " The Court rejected the dissenters' argument that
301 104 S. Ct. at 2816.
002 Id. at 2813 n.10. The Court explained that although courts of appeal have the power under
the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f) (1982), to modify orders of the Board, "the power to fashion
remedies 'is for the Board to wield, not for the courts. — 104 S. Ct. at 2813 (quoting Seven - Up, 344
U.S. at 346). The rationale for this deference, the Court explained, is that the relation of remedy
to policy is peculiarly a matter for the Board's expertise. Id. at 2813 (quoting Phelps, 313 U.S. at
194).
3"3 Id, at 2813, 2814, The Court emphasized that a formal record would provide particular
facts and opportunity for the employer Sure-Tan to present mitigating evidence. The Board could
then apply a reasonable formula to these facts, and thereby determine the compensation due. Id.
at 2814 n.11.
304 See supra note 6 for relevant text of § 10(c) of the Act.
30 ' 104 S. Ct. at 2813.
3 °6 /d. at 2814.
307 Id, at 2813-14.
"Id. at 2814. The Court objected in particular to the absence of any evidence whatsoever as
to the period of time the illegal alien employees might have continued working before apprehension
by the INS, and to the absence of opportunity for the employer Sure-Tan to present mitigating
evidence. Id. at 2814 n.11.
303 id. at 2815.
9 ' 0 Id.
311 Id .
" Id. at 2816. The majority similarly reversed the court of appeals for exceeding its reviewing
authority on drafting and verification. Id.
31s
	 at 2814-15.
314
	 at 2815. On remand before the Board, Sure-Tan, 277 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 120 1_,R.R.M.
1278 (1985), the Board did not order any backpay award. Regarding the subject of a minimum
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the absence of such remedies for the illegally discharged aliens was a "disturbing anom-
aly."315 The cease and desist order would remain intact, the majority reasoned, and were
petitioners to engage in similar activities, they would be subject to contempt sanctions. 916
Moreover, the majority explained, adopting novel reinstatement or minimum backpay
awards would be in derogation of the statutory limits placed on the Board's discretion
by Congress through the statutory directives of the INA and the NLRA. 3 " Any resultant
anomaly, the majority concluded, is one which Congress, not the Court, has the pero-
gative to correct. 318
D. Concurring and Dissenting: Justice Brennan, Joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens
Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined, con-
curred in the Court's holding that illegal aliens are "employees" within the NLRA, and
that the employer Sure-Tan violated the Act by constructively discharging the illegal
aliens,"° but dissented on the remedial issue. 32° justice-Brennan agreed that the proper
course for the court of appeals, if it was unsatisfied with the proposed order, would-be
to remand the case to the Board."' Because the Board acquiesced in the six month
minimum backpay element imposed by the court of appeals, however, Justice Brennan
felt that no purpose would be served by a remand. 322 In Justice Brennan's view, therefore,
the Court should have approached the case as if the Board had developed the remedial
order on its own and the court of appeals had simply enforced that order. 323
Justice Brennan noted that the majority had in essence devised a new, less deferential
standard for reviewing the propriety of remedies ordered under the NLRA by the
Board. 3" This new standard, requiring that the remedy be "sufficiently tailored" to the
particular unfair labor practice, Justice Brennan maintained, represented a departure
from the traditional deference given by the Court to the Board's remedial formula-
tions. 323 Justice Brennan stated that the appropriate standard of review"' is to uphold
a backpay order by the Board unless it is "a patent attempt to achieve ends other than
those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act." 327
backpay award, the Board stated, Itlhe Board is now mindful of the Court's holding that we may
not order a minimum backpay award without specific regard to the discriminatees' actual economic
losses or legal availability for work." Id. at 1279. The Board ordered the employer to draft rein-
statement offers in Spanish, to deliver the offers in a manner that would allow verification of
receipt, and to keep the offers open for four years. Id. The reinstatement offers were conditioned
on legal reentry into the United States. Id. at 1279 n.5.
315 104 S. Ct. at 2815 n.13.
"G id.
517 Id.
318 id. The Court apparently recognized in its finding that illegal aliens are employees within
the meaning of the NLRA yet are without a remedy for violations of their protected rights.
31 ' 1 Id. at 2816 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
.' 20 Id. at 2816,2817 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22 21 	at 2817 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).3
 Id.
325 Id.
521 Id,
:2256 ;c1d
"7 Id. (quoting Seven-Up, 344 U.S. at 346-47).
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In analyzing the remedial issue under this traditional standard of review, Justice
Brennan first noted that the the purpose of the backpay remedy is to restore the victims
of discrimination as nearly as possible to the status quo and to effectuate the important
public purposes of the Act.'" A minimum award would fulfill this function, Justice
Brennan argued, because the illegal alien workers clearly suffered some loss of income
due to the employer's unfair labor practices." 29 justice Brennan further contended that
a minimum backpay award to illegal alien victims of discrimination would not be imper-
missibly conjectural as it would not be in any way more conjectural than other remedies
developed by the Board and approved by courts.'" Moreover, Justice Brennan main-
tained that a minimum backpay award would be warranted because a conventional
calculation of backpay would leave the illegal alien workers without remedy."'
Justice Brennan also noted that the majority's instructions on remand stated that
the discharged employees must be deemed unavailable for work during any period in
which they are not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States,'"
Such an approach, Justice Brennan maintained, directly conflicts with the Board's long-
standing practice of forgiving unavailability when caused by employers' illegal conduct,""
Thus, Justice Brennan concluded that the majority created an anomaly by, on the
one hand, declaring that illegal aliens are covered by the protections of the NLRA, while
on the other hand, effectively depriving them of any remedy.'" By preventing the Board
from granting an effective remedy, Justice Brennan reasoned, the majority actually
undermined the NLRA and INA, 3" because employers will realize that they may dis-
criminate against their illegal alien employees without risk of having to pay backpay.
According to Justice Brennan, such effective immunity from the mandates of the NLRA
will in turn increase the incentive to employers to hire exploitable illegal aliens." 6
E. Concurring and Dissenting: Justice Powell, Joined by Justice Rehnquist
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
criticized the Court's finding that illegal alien employees are "employees" within the
32, Id. at 2818 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
329 Id. at 2817 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"° Id. at 2818 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See, e.g., NLRB v.
Superior Roofing Co., 460 F.2d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1972); Buncher v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 787, 789-
90 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828 (1969); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360
F.2d 569, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1966). See supra notes 205-20 and accompanying text for discussion of
the permissibility of conjectural backpay awards.
331 104 S. Ct. at 2819 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92 Id. at 2818 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3" Id. See, e.g., Graves Trucking Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 344, 345 (1979), enf'd as modified, 692 F.2d
470, 474-77 (7th Cir. 1982); Moss Planning Mill Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 414, enf'd, 206 F.2d 557 (4th
Cir. 1953).
"4 104 S. Ct. at 2819 (Brennan, J., concurring in part arid dissenting in part).
935 Id .
"5 Id. Justice Brennan also discussed the court of appeals' modification of the reinstatement
period, and the drafting and verification of the reinstatement offers. Id. at 2820 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan reiterated his contention that although
the lower court should have remanded the case, the Court should treat the order as the Board's
own. Such a result is justified, in Justice Brennan's view, because the Board fully accepted the lower
court's modifications, Id.
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meaning of the NLRA. 337 Terming the illegal alien employees as persons wanted by the
United States for violation of its criminal laws, Justice Powell found it unlikely that
Congress intended to accord such persons the protections of the Act."' justice Powell
then stated that he would logically therefore also dissent from the remedies part of the
Court's opinion, since he would hold that the deported workers are not entitled to any
remedy.359 Nevertheless, Justice Pow ell joined the Court's opinion on remedies, asserting
that given the Court's holding that the illegal aliens were covered by the Act, they are
entitled to the protections of the NLRA. 54° In a footnote Justice Powell added that he
preferred the Court's remedy rather than that urged in the dissenting opinion, because
the former provides less incentive for aliens to enter and reenter the United States
III. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S OPINION IN SURE-TAN
In Sure-Tan the Supreme Court held that illegal aliens are employees within the
meaning of the NLRA and that the employer had constructively discharged the aliens
by reporting them to the INS in retaliation for their union activities. The Court, however,
overturned the court of appeals' remedial order, effectively depriving them of any
backpay award.
This section maintains that the Court's holding that illegal aliens are employees
under the NLRA is consistent with previous interpretations of the Act. Part III also
argues that the Court's finding of constructive discharge was proper, even though it
extended the constructive discharge doctrine and was not necessary under the previous
contours of the doctrine. Finally, Part III asserts that the Court in Sure-Tan announced
a new, more intrusive standard of review, without sufficient justification, that marks a
narrower scope of the Board's remedial authority. By reaching this decision, the Court
mocks its own holding that the court of appeals intruded into the Board's domain by
modifying the Board's order, as well as its own holding that illegal aliens are covered by
the NLRA. Thus, in reality the Court endows illegal aliens rights without a remedy.
A. Illegal Aliens Are "Employees" Under The NLRA
The Court divided its analysis of whether illegal aliens are employees under the
NLRA into two inquiries. The first was the construction of section 2(3)'s definition of
employee. For this inquiry the Court looked to past Board practice, the significant
deference owed to the Board's expertise, and the Court's own facial reading of the Act.
The second inquiry was whether reading the NLRA to protect illegal aliens would conflict
with the INA. The following two subsections correspond to the Court's two stage analysis
of the status of illegal aliens under the NLRA.
1. Construction of Section 2(3) of the NLRA
The Supreme Court's holding that illegal aliens are employees within the meaning
of section 2(3) of the NLRA is based on two rationales, The first rationale articulated by
337 Id. , at 2820 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
338 Id.
539 Id .
340 Id,
341 Id. at 2820 n.* (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the Supreme Court in Sure -Tan for including illegal aliens in the definition of employee,
namely that it effectuates the policies of the Act by permitting employee solidarity, 342 is
persuasive. The Supreme Court has emphasized the critical importance of employee
solidarity in previous cases concerning the exclusivity of employees' selected collective
bargaining agent. 343 Employee solidarity expressed through exclusivity, the Court has
explained, is a prerequisite for effective collective bargaining. 344 If different groups
advanced their separate demands with regard to job assignments and promotions, 545
then the competing demands would set one group against the other. As a result the
collective strength of the employees would be weakened 9 46 When employees come
together under a regime of majority rule and selection of an exclusive bargaining agent,
on the other hand, the employees wield their collective strength to secure themselves
benefits. 342 This efficacious solidarity, the Court has observed, is an essential condition
of industrial peace. 34 8 The Court's holding in Sure - Tan that illegal aliens are employees
within the NLRA thus has sound support within the Act itself because it encourages the
employee solidarity which is necessary to realize the fundamental aims of the Act.
The Court's second rationale is that the Board has consistently held that illegal aliens
are employees within section 2(3) of the Act, 349 The consistent Board practice which the
Court relies on, however, is weak support for the Court's holding because this NLRB
practice has not had a long history,"° and boils down to nothing more than the propo-
sition that there is no reason to distinguish legal from illegal aliens."' Thus, the Board '
has not articulated a persuasive rationale for its decisions that illegal aliens are employees
under the Act. Noncitizens certainly might be distinguished from illegal aliens. Having
entered and remained in the country in knowing violation of the laws, it can be reasonably
maintained that illegal aliens should not enjoy the same privileges as those who have
respected the federal immigration laws by following the formal procedure, waiting, and
then gaining lawful entry into the United States. In other areas of law such a distinction
is made between legal and illegal aliens. For example, the benefits of federal social
security, 352 medicare, 353 and food stamps, 354 are denied to illegal aliens, but not to aliens
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
545 See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1975).
344 Id at 62.
345 id. at 67.
5461d. at 67-68.
347 Id. at 62.
Id. at 68.
949 See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text for the Court's treatment of the NLRB
decisions holding that illegal aliens are employees within the meaning of the NLRA.
's° See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text for discussion of the NLRB's decisions in-
volving the status of illegal aliens under the NLRA.
" I See supra notes 53-56 for a presentation of the Board's analysis in cases holding that illegal
aliens are covered by the NLRA.
552
	 1614(f) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B) (1976), denies Supple-
mentary Security Income benefits to aliens unlawfully present in the United States.
5s5 U.S.C. § 1395(o)(2) (1976). Those legally present aliens qualifying must also have resided
in the United States continually for five years prior to application for medicare benefits, This
provision was held constitutional in Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 87 (1976). The Court in Matthews
reasoned that aliens, as guests, are not constitutionally entitled to privileges available to citizens. Id.
at 82. Congress had to draw a line somewhere, and its choice was not unreasonable, the Court
March 1986]	 CASENOTES	 443
lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise lawfully residing permanently
in the United States. 355 Furthermore, in the recent case of Plyler v. Doe356 the Court
recognized the legitimacy of special exclusions of illegal aliens stating that illegal alienage
is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection clause because their presence
in this country in violation of federal law is not a "constitutional irrelevancy."'"
Even though the reasoning of past Board decisions extending NLRA coverage to
illegal aliens is weak, the Court's reliance on past Board practice was nevertheless ap-
propriate because of the significant deference owed to the Board's interpretation of who
is an employee under the NLRA. The Supreme Court in Sure-Tan correctly stated that
the standard of review in the section 2(3) context is that the Board's interpretation will
be upheld where it is 'reasonably defensible."353 Despite the weak rationale in the Board's
line of cases holding that illegal aliens are employees within the meaning of section 2(3)
of the Act, the simple fact that the Board has over a period of time flexibly applied the
definition of employee suggests that considerable judicial deference to the Board's def-
inition of employee is appropriate. Moreover, the Court's approval of the Board's manner
of construction of this Act is logically sound. The broad terms of the definition of
employee in the statute contrast sharply with the specific statutory exclusions.'" When
an individual worker does not fall within one of these specific exclusions, a presumption
would seem to arise that he or she is included in the term "employee" of section 2(3) of
the Act.
A closer analysis than that given by the Board or the Court shows that there is
further support for holding illegal aliens to be employees under the NLRA. Past inter-
pretation of who is an employee under the Act has focused on the functional, economic
role of the individuals in question. The anchor case for this kind of analysis, and of the
interpretation of section 2(3), is NLRB Ti. Hearst Publications Inc., where the Supreme
Court upheld the Board's ruling that newsboys were employees within the meaning of
the Act. 36° In Hearst the Court stated that the NLRA's applicability is to be determined
broadly, by underlying economic facts rather than technically by previously established
legal classifications. 361 Viewed in terms of economic relationships, a worker's immigration
explained. Id. at 83. "In short, citizens and those who are most like citizens qualify. Those who are
less like citizens do not." Id.
'" 7 U.S.C. § 2015(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
3" But undocumented aliens do have many rights. See, e.g., Moreau v. Oppenheim, 663 F.2d
1300, 1307-08 (5th Cir. 1981) (undocumented aliens entitled to damages for breach of contract of
a sale); Gates v. River Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 1020, 1021-22 (Alaska 1973) (illegal aliens entitled to
wages under labor contract); Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 220, 399 N.Y.S.2d
854, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (undocumented aliens entitled to wages due under a labor contract).
"6 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler the Court struck down a state statute which witheld from local
school districts any education funds going to educate illegally present children. Id. at 205-06. The
Court ruled that illegal aliens are covered by the Equal Protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 210. The Court found the state failed to show that
the statute furthered some substantial goal of the state. Id. at 217-18. The decision in Plyler is a
departure from conventional equal protection analysis, which would have required only a showing
that the statute had a rational basis, since no suspect classification of fundamental right was involved.
See Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CoLum. L. REV. 1, 54-58 (1984).
357
	 457 U.S. at 223.
333 Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2803, 2809.
359 See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
5w 322 U.S. 111, 132 (1944).
561 Id. at 129.
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status is irrelevant to whether he is functionally in an employee relationship with the
employer. 362
 The Act itself addresses the workplace in terms of functions performed
and economic relationship of the people there, identifying groups as "employees," "su-
pervisors," "professional employee," and "employer." 363
This argument, taken together with the Court's and Board's reasoning that the
inclusion of illegal alien workers as employees is consistent with the language of the Act
and the Act's policy of encouraging and protecting the collective bargaining process by
removing a catalyst for employee fragmentation, makes for a persuasive and strong basis
for upholding the Board's interpretation. The Court, therefore, correctly applied the
standard of review, finding that the Board's interpretation was "reasonably defensible." 369
interpretation of the NLRA alone, however, was not sufficient to rule in Sure -Tan that
illegal aliens are employees under the Act; the Court also had to address the employer's
argument that the INA would conflict with such a holding.
2. Interface of NLRA Section 2(3) and the INA
The Court's ruling that extension of the protections of the NLRA to illegal immi-
grants does not conflict with the mandate of the INA and actually serves its purposes is
persuasive, because in other statutory contexts illegal aliens arc given the protections of
other labor market statutes. For example, an employer of illegal aliens must meet the
standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Act"?' and the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 366
 An employer must also pay social security taxes for illegal alien workers, 367 and
in forty-nine out of fifty states must provide workers' compensation protection to injured
workers regardless of whether the worker is an illegal alien. 368
 The rationale for extend-
ing these protections to illegal aliens is that it will eliminate the advantages to employers
in hiring illegal aliens. As a result there will be a decreased demand for illegal aliens,
and supply — the level of illegal immigration — will correspondingly decrease, thus
effectuating policies of the INA.
Although the extending of the protections of the NLRA to illegal aliens also serves
the purposes of the INA, the Court is incorrect in stating that the Board's interpretation
is consistent with the INA for the reason that employment of illegal aliens is only a
peripheral concern of the INA. 369
 The Court's assertion simply does not square with the
fact that a primary purpose of the INA is to preserve jobs for American workers. 3" In
DeCanas v. Bica, 371
 for example, the Court upheld a state employer sanctions statute
against a challenge that the state statute was preempted by federal immigration law." 2
In a later case the Court explained that in DeCanas the state statute was not preempted
362
 The Court took such a functional analysis approach in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 288 (1974) (Court defined "managerial employees" by reference to the functions per-
formed at the workplace).
3"' 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
' al Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
' 63 North, Labor Market Rights of Foreign-born Workers, MONTHLY LAH. REV., May, 1982, at 32,
33.
,66 Id.
"7 Id.
"8 Id. The exception is Vermont. Id.
"9
 See, e.g., Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2809 (citing DeCanas v. Rica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976)).
17° Id. at 2810.
"' 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
372
 Id. at 362.
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by the INA because the state statute reflected Congress's intention embodied in the INA
to bar from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of permission to work
in this country. 373 The INA, therefore, has much more than merely a peripheral concern
with the employment of illegal aliens. This congressional intent, moreover, is concretely
fulfilled through the enforcement of the INA provisions through INS raids such as in
Sure-Tan and by allowing only the entry of immigrants who will not displace American
workers."4
The Court's conclusion that the INA is only peripherally concerned with the em-
ployment of illegal aliens, though incorrect, is understandable because the INA does not
express a uniform policy toward the employment of illegal aliens. Although the [NA
prohibitions on the entry of aliens who do not comply with its provisions regarding
employment indicate the I NA's concern with the general issue of the employment of
illegal aliens, two other aspects of the INA point to the opposite conclusion. First,
Congress has not made it a separate criminal offense for an illegal alien to accept
employtnent."' Second, when the INA was originally passed, a specific exemption was
included in the INA, the so-called "Texas Proviso," which stated that employment of
illegal aliens did not constitute the offense of "harboring" illegal aliens. 376
 As a result,
employers are free under the INA to employ illegal aliens. Thus, although the Court in
Sure-Tan was incorrect in stating that the INA has only a peripheral concern with the
employment of illegal aliens, the Court was correct to hold that the INA does not bar
the Court from holding illegal aliens to be protected by the NLRA. The Court's conclu-
sion is correct because the INA is internally inconsistent, with the effect that it does not
express a uniform policy of protecting American labor as well as the NLRA cloes. 3"
Concern about the growing influx of illegal aliens into the country, and the realiza-
tion that the INA is internally inconsistent, may lead to the amending of the INA to
include sanctions against employers who hire illegal aliens so as to make employment of
illegal - alien workers less desirable. 379 On the federal level, the Simpson-Mazzoli bil1, 379
which would subject employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens to fines and prison
terms, has been defeated for yet another congressional session. But it will surely be back
again"' for future debate:181
575 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225. See also Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 76 n.29 (1974) (INA concern
is to preserve jobs for American workers).
571 Section 212(a)(14) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982), states in relevant part:
The following classes of aliens ... shall be excluded from admission into the United
States ... (14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing
skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified
to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient
workers in the United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available ... to
perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens will
not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United
States similarly employed ....
375 See Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
576 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). The specific INA "harboring" exemption is 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (1976).
377 See supra text accompanying notes 273-83 for the Sure-Tan Court's reasoning on the issue
of INA/NLRA conflict.
37,
 See infra note 380.
5" Passed May 18, 1983 by Senate. See 129 CONG. REC. 6970 (1983); S. REP. No. 62, 98TH
Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1983).
556 The United States Senate and House of Representatives passed comprehensive immigration
bills in 1983 and 1984. The legislation died in October 1984 after a conference committee failed
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If Congress passes such an amendment to the INA then any conflict between the
NLRA and the INA would probably be resolved in favor of the INA because of the
"accommodation doctrine." 582
 This doctrine requires the NLRB to take into account
other federal statutes when administering the NLRA. in Sure-Tan the Court applied this
doctrine by deciding that illegal aliens could be deemed employees within the meaning
of the NLRA only after carefully noting that the INA was not in conflict with the
NLRA. 3" Similarly, the Court in Sure-Tan explained that accommodating the INA with
the NLRA required that the discharged illegal alien employees be deemed unavailable
for work while not entitled to be present in the United States." Given the Sure - Tan
Court's emphasis on deciding whether a NLRAIINA conflict exists, and deferring to the
INA when it perceived such a conflict, if the INA were amended to outlaw the employ-
ment of illegal aliens, the Court might well rule that the illegal alien employees should
no longer be deemed employees within the NLRA. 385
B. Constructive Discharge
In finding that the retaliatory notification of INS and subsequent arrest and exit of
the illegal aliens was a constructive discharge, 386 the Sure -Tan Court extended the con-
structive discharge doctrine."' In examining this doctrine, the Court adhered to the
to reach agreement. Senator Alan K. Simpson, Republican of Wyoming, and now the Senate
majority whip, said he intended to resume his efforts to pass a bill prohibiting employment of
illegal aliens. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,1985, at 1, col. 4. In 1952 when the INA was on the Senate floor,
Senator Douglas proposed an amendment for sanctions on employers who knowingly hired illegal
aliens. This amendment was also extensively debated before being defeated. 98 CONG. REC. 798–
802,803-11 (1952).
38 ' For a thoughtful and critical analysis of employer sanction legislation, see Smith & Mendez,
Employer Sanctions and Other Labor Market Restrictions on Alien Employment: The "Scorched Earth" Ap-
proach to Immigration Control, 6 N.C.J. 12+41 .1 & COMM. REG. 19 (1980-1981). For a review advocating
employer sanction legislation, see Comment, Employer Sanctions, supra note 270.
582 See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
183 Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2815.
584
 Id.
585 Given the Court's decision in Sure-Tan, however, the question remains whether the NLRA
preempts state illegal alien employment legislation where exercise of NLRA rights is involved. The
Court's decision in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), clears the way for state employment
sanction laws. In DeCanas, the Court ruled that the INA does not necessarily preempt harmonious
state regulation, or state regulation where the federal immigration scheme is only peripherally
concerned and the state interest — employment of its residents — is in the mainstream of the police
power. The Court remanded to the California court to determine the scope of section 2805. Id. at
364-65. Thus, state employer sanctions are apparently permissible under the present INA. Several
states have employer sanction laws. See generally Note, State Regulation of Employment of Illegal Aliens:
A Constitutional Approach, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 565 (1973).
The recent decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), however, undercuts the .scope of
permissible state regulation of illegal aliens because it may signal a perception by the Court that
illegal aliens are becoming part of the nation, integrating themselves into both the local and national
community. For an excellent and thought-provoking analysis of Plyler and immigration law, see
Schuck, supra note 356. It is yet to be seen whether the fact that Plyler involved education and
concerned children was of special significance to the Court, as perhaps is evidenced by the hybrid
equal protection analysis, rather than the fact that illegal aliens were involved.
"6 See supra text accompanying notes 285-92 for the Sure-Tan Court's reasoning on the issue
of constructive discharge.
587 See supra notes 96-137 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case law on the
development and meaning of the constructive discharge doctrine.
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Haberman two-prong test388
 — which requires that the employer create working condi-
tions so intolerable that the employee is forced to resign, and that the employer act with
intent to "encourage or discourage membership in any labor organizations"s" — and
found each prong to be satisfied in Sure -Tan."" In its application of the Haberman test,
the Sure -Tan Court broadened the definition of "intolerable working conditions" under
the first prong of the test. The notification of the INS in Sure -Tan does not fit any
definition of intolerable working conditions under the already loose definitions in prior
case law. In Sure-Tan the employer did not change the nature of the job"' nor verbally
harass and humiliate its illegal alien employees."2 The Court's extension of the construc-
tive discharge doctrine was sound nevertheless, because the employer's conduct in Sure-
Tan was simply a covert equivalent of directly firing the illegal aliens for having supported
the union.
The Supreme Court in Sure- Tan, however, in explaining the limits of its decision,
noted that absent anti-union animus the Board will not find constructive discharge of
illegal aliens where the alleged reason is their immigration status. 399
 Evidently an em-
ployer's deeds alone — discharge of illegal aliens, or notification of INS of illegal aliens
who have engaged in NLRA protected activities — will never be sufficient to trigger the
Great Dane presumption. 3" A stronger showing of anti-union animus is required, as in
Sure- Tan where the Board found that the anti-union animus requirement was "flagrantly
met."395
The Court thus effectively precludes the use of the Great Dane presumption of anti-
union animus when illegal aliens are involved, even where the employer's conduct is
egregious and is inherently destructive of employee rights under the NLRA. The Great
Dane presumption is an important protection for employees because intent can be
difficult to prove. In Sure-Tan the Court found the requirement of the presence of anti-
union animus to have been flagrantly met. In other, less clear cases, however, the Great
Dane presumption might be the only way the illegal aliens would be protected from a
constructive discharge. The Sure-Tan Court explained its requirement of a specific show-
ing of anti-union animus by stating that the reporting of illegal aliens is ordinarily to be
encouraged, not penalized. This rationale, however, overlooks the fact that when the
Great Dane presumption of anti-union animus operates, the employer can rebut it by
proffering a legitimate basis — desire to help enforce the immigration laws, for example
— for its conduct, or raise the defense that a legitimate motive outweighed its anti-union
animus. Thus, the Court should not have foreclosed the use of the Great Dane presump-
tion in cases involving the discriminatory discharge of illegal aliens. The effect of re-
jecting the use of the Great Dane presumptibn is a dampening of the likelihood of the
illegal aliens' expression of their NLRA rights.
If either state or federal employer sanction laws were involved in a Sure- Tan- like
situation there would likely be a mixed motive situation because helping to enforce laws
4H 8 NLRB v. Haberman Construction Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
589 Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2810.
599 Id.
39L See supra note 105 for constructive discharge cases involving claims of material changes in
job conditions.
592 See supra note 104 for constructive discharge cases involving claims of harassment and
humiliation.
393 Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2811.
594 See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
595 Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2810.
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prohibiting the hiring of illegal aliens would be presumed to be a good faith motive. 396
Notification of government authorities to help enforce the laws has been deemed a right
and even an obligation of citizenship. 397 The existence of valid state or federal employee
or employer sanction laws would therefore shape the issues in cases similar to Sure -Tan.
The motive of helping enforce the law or avoiding sanctions would not be dispositive,
however, if it were pretextual. 398 The Court in Sure -Tan stated that the nature of the
pretext is immaterial even if the pretext is a reliance on state or local laws."`' It would
appear, therefore, that an employer's defense that it acted out of concern for employer
or employee sanction laws would not be an absolute defense to an allegation of a
constructive discharge of an illegal alien.
It will be easier, nevertheless, for an employer to establish a bone fide motive for a
discharge (and constructive discharge) when illegal aliens are involved. When the em-
ployer does establish a good faith legitimate motive, and anti-union animus has also been
proven, there is a mixed motive situation. Whether the employer violated the NLRA
will depend on whether, under the various judicial formulations, the legitimate motive
outweighs the illegitimate motive. When illegal aliens are involved, that determination
will be whether the employer's legitimate motive of helping enforce the immigration
laws outweighs his anti-union animus.
Even an employer motivated by anti-union animus, therefore, can constructively
discharge illegal alien employees and increase the likelihood of successfully defending
against unfair labor practice charges if his conduct fits the following pattern. First, the
employer learns of the illegal alien employees' status after the employees engage in
protected activity. Second, the employer knows of valid employer or employee sanction
laws. Finally, the employer notifies the INS to check on the immigration status of the
employees. A shrewd employer would thus make sure not to learn of the employees'
immigration status until the right time."" In this manner, the employer's subsequent
constructive discharge of the employees would seemingly be protected under the Sure-
Tan decision.
The Court's analysis of the constructive discharge issue is straightforward, and leads
easily to the conclusion that the employer in Sure - Tan constructively discharged his illegal
alien workers when he retaliated against their exercise of NLRA rights by arranging for
an INS raid of the workplace, knowing that some of its employees were illegal aliens.
396 See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text for discussion of the Great Dane presumption
of anti-union animus.
"7 See In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 552, 535 (1895).
999 See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text for discussion of mixed motive discriminatory
discharge cases. The Court in Sure-Tan stated that the burden of showing bona fide justification of
the purported legitimate motive in a mixed motive situation is on the employer. 109 S. Ct. at 2811
n.6.
'99 Id.
4" The Sure-Tan Court stated that reporting violations of any criminal law is ordinarily to be
encouraged. Id. at 2811. In Sure-Tan, however, the privilege of notifying the INS of the employees'
illegal presence in the United States was outweighed by the rights of the illegal aliens as employees
under the NLRA, because it was motivated by anti-union animus. Proceeding with this analysis, the
Court soundly distinguished Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983). In
Sure-Tan, unlike in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the employer did not have a cognizable legal wrong
and was not petitioning the courts for redress of such wrong. In addition there was a diminished
state interest in the immigration situation in Sure-Tan than in the libel situation in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants. See Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2812.
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The facts in Sure -Tan, however, make this the easy case. In cases where anti-union animus
is not flagrant, the illegal aliens may find it more difficult to claim NLRA protections
since the Court precluded the possible use of the Great Dane presumption from the two-
prong test. In addition the Court's approval of employers helping enforce the immigra-
tion laws by notifying the INS may make it easier for employers to defend themselves
against claims of constructive discharge.
C. Remedies
The Court's treatment of remedies in Sure-Tan is troubling. The rights under the
NLRA, which the Court concluded after careful analysis that the illegal alien workers
possess, are given no practical effect by the Court. Using a new standard of review of
Board remedial orders, the Court rejected an extended reinstatement period or a min-
imum backpay award. Sure-Tan did present novel circumstances that tested the extent
of the Board's remedial power, but the Court refused to address the case in these terms.
The Court opted instead for dressing up its new standard of review as a traditional
assumption in judicial review of Board remedial orders, and disingenuously disposing
of the case on technical grounds.
The majority in Sure -Tan held that the court of appeals overstepped its bounds by
requiring a six month minimum backpay award and that the order was consequently
defective. 4°' The majority based its holding on the principle that judicial deference to
administrative agencies is owed by courts because administrative agencies have special
expertise."" Since the Board never applied its expertise to the order at issue, the majority
reasoned that the case should be remanded to the Board.'" By the very action of
acquiescing and then advocating the modified order of the court of appeals, however,
the Board in effect infused its expertise into the order.
The Court flatly refused to accept that the Board had brought its special expertise
to bear in Sure -Tan because of the disparity between the Board's original order and the
court of appeals' modified order. 4 €4 The Board's "mere acquiescence" in the modified
order could not cure its failure to separately apply its expertise, the majority stated.""
The majority sounded a different note, however, when it addressed Justice Brennan's
attack on the majority's ruling that the illegal aliens would be deemed 'unavailable for
work during any period they were not lawfully present in the United States. 406 The
majority stated that although the court of appeals had modified the Board order so as
to include the unavailability requirement, the Board had "clearly indicated its agreement"
with this modification by asking that the judgment be affirmed in its entirety."" This
inconsistent analysis by the Court indicates that the majority was result oriented in Sure-
Tan, setting out from the beginning to only grant illegal aliens rights under the NLRA
without a remedy.
The majority opinion applied a stricter standard of review which accords less de-
ference to the Board's remedial orders than under the traditional standard of review.
"I Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2813.
"2 Id at 2812.
4°3 Id. at 2813-16.
04 Id. at 2813 n.9.
402 Id.
4°° 1d. at 2813 n.12.
407 Id.
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The Court paid lip service to the principle of Phelps Dodge Corp. that a backpay order is
a means to restore the situation as nearly as possible to that which would have been
obtained but for the illegal discrimination.4 °8 The Court in Sure- Tan emphasized instead
that a backpay remedy must be "sufficiently tailored" so that it expunges "only the actual,
and not merely speculative, consequences of the unfair labor practices." 409 By developing
this new, less deferential standard of review, the Court has curtailed the remedial power
of the Board.
The Court dicfnot discuss its standard of review of Board orders as being new, but
rather termed it "a cardinal, albeit frequently unarticulated assumption.""° The Court
supported its standard on the foundation cases interpreting the NLRA's grant of re-
medial power to the Board: Phelps Dodge.91 ' and Seven - Up. 4 12 Although there is language
in these cases to support the majority's standard, 4 ' 3 the thrust of these cases is that the
Board must be allowed broad latitude in fashioning remedies, because the particular
nature of labor law calls for creative, particularized fashioning of relief. 4 ' 4 This is the
essence of the standard of review stated by the Seven:Up Court, and quoted by the dissent
as the appropriate, and previously the prevailing, one: "When the Board ... makes an
order of restoration by way of backpay 'the order should stand unless it can be shown
that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be
said to effectuate the policies of the Act. -413
The Court's new standard of review requiring the Board's orders to be "sufficiently
tailored" encroaches upon the Board's discretion. By violating the traditional standard
the majority is guilty of the same offense with which it charged the lower court, namely
that it impermissibly interfered with the Board's discretion in order to achieve a partic-
ular result. The Court's admonition to the lower court, therefore, applies to its own
decision: "Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for adminis-
trative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion
and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines
of law into the more spacious domain of policy."'"
The Court in Sure -Tan is guilty of this charge despite the fact that the Court formally
refused to fashion a new remedy and technically remanded the case to the Board on
the grounds that the lower court had surpassed its allowed scope of review. 4 ' 7 Despite
the remand, the Court effectively tied the Board's hands by its pronouncements on the
I" Id. at 2813 (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)).
4°9 Id. at 2813-14.
410 Id. at 2813.
4" 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
412 344 U.S. at 346-47.
419
	 example, the Phelps Dodge Court made the following statements: "[T]he power with
which Congress invested the Board implies responsibility .... [O]nly actual losses should be made
good .... The Board will thus have it within its power to avoid delays and difficulties incident to
passing on remote and speculative claims ...." 313 U.S. at 194, 198, 199.
414 Id. at 198 ("in applying its authority over back pay orders, the Board has not used stereotyped
formulas but has availed itself of the freedom given it by Congress to attain just results in diverse,
complicated situations").
415 Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2817 (quoting Seven-Up, 344 U.S. at 346-47 (quoting Virginia Electric
Light & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943))); see also NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co.,
396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969) (quoting same).
41s
	 104 S. Ct. at 2813 (quoting Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 194).
417 Id. at 2813, 2816.
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parameters of permissible backpay orders. 4 ' 8
 The "sufficiently tailored" standard applied
by the majority is not the traditional standard of deference given to the formulation of
remedies by the Board, but is closer to an analysis of whether the order is punitive rather
than remedia1. 4 ' 8
 The Court has consistently held that Board orders may not be puni-
tive.420
 The Court stated that in light of its disposition of the case by remand it "may
thus avoid entering into what we have previously deemed the 'bog of logomachy' as to
what is 'remedial' and what is 'punitive.'"42 ' The Court's formal disposition of the case
is a ruse. The Court has appropriated the boundary of punitive orders, disguised it as
the initial standard of review of Board orders, and side-stepped a bog of analysis through
which it might not have been able to reach the same result.
Under the traditional standard of review the minimum backpay remedy would
probably have been permissible. It is true that the minimum backpay order falls outside
of the boundaries of the permissible degree of conjecture permitted by courts in the
past. 422 Specifically, in Sure-Tan there was no production of a record of relevant infor-
mation, no analysis of the information in the form of a written opinion, and no oppor-
tunity for the employer to present mitigating evidence. The Court was obligated, if it
had adhered to the traditional standard of review, to decide whether this high degree
of conjecture made the Board order punitive and thus impermissible. The case law on
what is punitive is indeed, as the Court characterized it, a bog of logomachy. Avoiding
analysis because it is difficult, however, is no excuse for a court. Although the minimum
backpay order was more speculative than any past remedies fashioned by the Board,
this increased conjecture was essential to avoid depriving the illegal aliens of any remedy
and thereby rendering their rights under the NLRA nothing more than empty assur-
ances. Considering that both Congress, through the NLRA, and case law endow the
Board with the power to fashion an exceptional remedy in the face of an exceptional
situation as in Sure-Tan, the minimum backpay award would therefore likely have been
upheld under the traditional standard of review.
CONCLUSION
Sure- Tan presented three significant issues. First, it involved the issue of whether
illegal aliens are "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act
so as to be covered by the Act's protections against unfair labor practices. Second, it
addressed the issue of whether the employer's retaliatory notification of the INS and
the subsequent raid at the workplace, followed by the voluntary deportation of several
illegal alien employees, constituted a constructive discharge. Third, it posed a question
as to the appropriate remedies the Board may order when considering three factors:
the accepted scope of the Board's remedial power, the fact that the employees' presence
in the United States violated federal immigration law, and the right or obligation of
citizenship to aid in law enforcement.
418 Id. at 2813-14.
419
 See, e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1952); Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
420 Republic Steel, 311 U.S. at 10-12.
42 ' Sure -Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2816 n.14 (quoting Seven
- Up, 344 U.S. at 348).
42s
	 supra notes 204-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the permissibility of
conjectural backpay awards.
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Although the Board's short history of holding that illegal aliens are employees under
the NLRA is without a sound analytic foundation, the Court recognized that judicial
deference is due to the Board's interpretation because of the Board's expertise. Both
the statutory analysis and the conclusion that such an interpretation effectuates the
policy of the Act strongly argue in favor of including illegal aliens within the term
"employees" in section 2(3) of the NLRA. The Court correctly adopted this view. In
regard to the issue of constructive discharge, by holding that the employer had construc-
tively discharged his illegal alien employees by arranging an INS raid out of anti-union
animus, the Court extended the constructive discharge doctrine from its already amor-
phous boundaries. This holding was also appropriate, however, given the special circum-
stances presented by the employees' illegal immigration status.
The Court also introduced a new standard of review of Board remedial orders:
they must be "sufficiently tailored" to expunge only actual losses caused by the unfair
labor practices. This new standard is more intrusive and breaks with the Court's tradi-
tional deference in this area. Although the Court purported to not raise the issue of
whether a minimum backpay order is "punitive," and hence not enforceable, the Court
injected precisely this prohibition into its new standard of review.
The Court purports to find the illegal aliens in Sure-Tan to be employees within,
and thus protected by, the NLRA. The constructively discharged aliens are out of their
jobs ;
 sent out of the country, deprived of any backpay, and are not entitled to reinstate-
ment until they legally reenter the country, which is likely a long time away. The Court
purports to give the illegal aliens full NLRA rights. All the illegal alien workers really
got in Sure -Tan, however, was a piece of paper saying that their NLRA rights had been
trampled upon. By denying a minimum backpay award, the Court in effect deprives
illegal alien workers of any remedy. Thus, as Justice Brennan asserted, "[t]he contradic-
tion in the Court's opinion is total."'" The Court holds that illegal alien workers are to
receive the full protection of the NLRA, yet when it conies to giving these paper
guarantees practical effect, the Court says no.
JOHN W. SAGASER
'' Sure-Tan, 104 S. Ct. at 2819.
